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Omri Ben-Shahar,* David A. Hoffman,** and Cathy Hwang***
ABSTRACT
Contract law has one overarching goal: to advance the legitimate
interests of the contracting parties. For the most part, scholars,
judges, and parties embrace this party primacy norm, recognizing
only a few exceptions, such as mandatory rules that bar
enforcement of agreements that harm others. This Article
describes a distinct species of previously unnoticed contract law
rules that advance nonparty interests, which it calls “nonparty
defaults.”
In doing so, this Article makes three contributions to the
contract law literature. First, it identifies nonparty defaults as a
judicial technique. It shows how courts deviate from the party
primary norm with surprising frequency through a variety of
default rules, interpretation practices, and remedies. These
defaults are meant to protect nonparties’ interests and benefit
society at large. Second, it develops a normative account as to
when common law courts adjudicating contract disputes are a
suitable forum to identify and advance nonparty interests.
Finally, it documents and explains the surprising durability of
nonparty defaults, which the parties could, but rarely do,
disclaim.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract law is defined by one overarching goal: to advance the
contracting parties’ legitimate interests.1 Courts generally enforce the
agreements parties choose to enter and the promises they wish to make,
providing them the power to form relationships and “effect changes” in
their affairs.2 Unlike other types of private law rights and obligations, like
torts, property, or restitution, contract law often allows parties to ignore the
interests of third parties, the community, or the government.
Contract law’s focus on the parties’ interests extends beyond the
substance of contracts and into the rules and doctrines that govern contract
enforcement by courts. The cardinal rule of contract interpretation and
enforcement is that judges should seek to identify the parties’ intent. When
intent is ambiguous, judges might turn to a party-centric backstop—the
underlying interests of the parties, their backgrounds, and objectives—to
figure out what their intent might be.3
This loyalty of contract law to the interests and plans of the
contracting parties—what we call the “party primacy norm”—is so
tautologically part of the contract law that it is rarely challenged.4 Indeed,
historical and present-day contract law debates tend to focus on competing
and evolving conceptions of the party primacy norm—how to identify and
interpret the parties’ intent, how to supplement it, and how to grant the
parties’ interests adequate protection.5
11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:2 (4th ed. 2009); 5 TIMOTHY
MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.23 (2021).
2 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941).
3 Lord, supra note 1; Murray, supra note 1.
4 A few scholars have begun to chip away at aspects of this norm. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi,
Interpreting Contracts in a Regulatory State, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 35 (2020) (justifying intervention
in contracts for societal interests); Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG.
211, 243 (2015) [hereinafter Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts] (arguing that the diffuse
social interests should be considered when construing ambiguous contract terms); Cathy
Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Contractual Depth, __ MINN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022)
(showing that contract drafters sometimes include the intent of regulators, rather than only
the parties themselves, into their contracts); Sarah Winsberg, Contract’s Covert Meddlers (on
file with authors) (nonparty interests in partnership law).
5 See, e.g., See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context:
Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–26 (201) [hereinafter
Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, Text and Context] (describing some of the differences between
textualist and contexualist approaches to contract interpretation); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1765 (1996) (critiquing a contextualist approach); Cathy Hwang, Collaborative Intent,
__ VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022) (nothing that “perhaps the longest-standing debate
in contract theory is the evidence question: whether judges should consider extrinsic
evidence in making their decisions”); Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains, Multi-Agreement
Contracting in Complex Mergers & Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2015) (discussing the
debate between textualists and contextualist); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 931–32 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott,
1
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Of course, parties’ freedom to advance their joint goals is cabined
by nonparties’ legally protected interests. These limits to the party primacy
norm, however, are usually transplants from statutes and principles
originating in other areas of the law.6 Criminal law instructs contract law
not to enforce conspiracies, even they are clearly in the parties’ interests;
Zoning laws limit the type of leases landlords and tenants may enter; and
competition law sets limits on mergers or covenants not to compete.
Through the concept of agreements against public policy judges evaluating
contracts import the regulatory mandates of other bodies of law.
This Article is organized around the observation that the party
primacy norm has more exceptions than these familiar mandatory
guardrails. We call these exceptions nonparty defaults. These are doctrines of
contract through which courts construct and shape the scope of contractual
obligations to advance nonparties’ interests, and do so without direct
command from other areas of law and with full permission for the parties
to opt out. We show that these nonparty defaults are both abundant and
durable.
A court’s choice of whether to grant the specific performance
remedy for breach provides a good example. Typically, it depends on how
well the aggrieved party’s interest can be protected by monetary damages.7
But in several leading cases, courts have considered the interests of
nonparties in the performance of the contract in shaping the remedy. For
example, in a landmark case, a Delaware court forced two companies to
complete a transaction to protect interests of workers and communities,
noting that “[t]he impact of a forced merger on constituencies beyond the
stockholders and top managers of [the companies] weighs heavily .”8
In a rich array of other contexts, courts also take nonparty interest
into account. Insurance contracts provide striking examples. Whether to
serve interests of auto accident victims, a clean environment, or victims of
mass torts, courts (by default) construe the language of liability insurance
policies broadly.9 While policyholders sometimes benefit from such proContract Interpretation Redux] (laying out some basic differences between textualist and
contextualist interpretation approaches to contract interpretation).
6 See, generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 8 Introductory Note; § 178(1)
(AM. L. INST. 1979) (“A promise of other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable”). A large literature
discusses specific legislative policies that set limits to enforcement of contracts. See, e.g.
David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 979,
988 (2021) (nothing that “there is a relatively nascent literature eon the externalities of
contracts”); Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 483, 493–95 (2010) (analyzing social costs of illegal contracts in the form
of negative externalities).
7
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 359 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
8 In re IBP S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 83 (Del. Ch. 2001).
9 See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 864 A.2d 368, 375 (N.H.
2005) (in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court embraced a liberal approach of
insurance coverage that “effectively furthers the state’s policy of compensating and
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coverage interpretation, the main benefits accrue to their victims and to
diffuse social interests. It is the desire to promote these nonparty interests
that courts expressly invoke as their canon of interpretation.
The article has two primary purposes. The first is to demonstrate
the prevalence of nonparty defaults, and the second is to explain and to
partially justify their existence. To do so, this article proceeds in three parts.
Part I sets the stage. It provides a (very brief) statement of the party primacy
norm, its justifications, and its common exceptions. It shows that existing
exceptions to the norm are mandatory rules transplanted from other
substantive areas of the law. Part II—the heart of the article—then reveals
the world of nonparty defaults: it shows how judges use default rules,
interpretation norms, and remedial principles to advance nonparty interests
in a variety of cases.
In Part III, this article turns to its second purpose: justifying the
existence of nonparty defaults. To do so, we address two primary concerns.
The first is a normative inquiry: are common law courts adjudicating
contract disputes based on records developed by the parties the best
institution to promote societal interests? We argue that in using nonparty
defaults courts could serve as a useful supplement to legislation in looking
out for broader social good. The second is a feasibility concern. Are
nonparty defaults worth the candle, given the parties’ ability to contract
around them? We show that even though parties can disclaim nonparty
defaults, many stick—for good reasons. We finally introduce a new way of
thinking about the utility of non-mandatory rules: as “first response” aids
when new and anticipated problems and emergencies pop up.
This article is not the first to recognize the role of nonparty interests
in contract law.10 But most limits on contracting come from other areas of
law—such as bankruptcy, securities, and employment law. Very little
attention has been paid to nonparty interests within contract law, and even
less to non-mandatory rules. Recognizing that nonparty defaults have been
shaping contract interpretation and construction, court-designed gapfillers, and remedies, opens a new lens into the social role of contract law.
This article’s goal is thus to describe an ongoing phenomenon and

protecting innocent accident victims from financial disaster.” For more examples, see infra
Part II.B.
10 See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993);
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1710, 1723-24 (1997) [hereinafter Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy] (discussion of Rest
207 as a public interest rule); Eyal Zamir (featuring Ian Ayres), A Theory of Mandatory Rules:
Typology, Policy, and Design, 99 TEX. L. REV. 283, 291 (2020) (“when externalities are the
primary concern, procedural interventions will more likely rely on methods that discourage
harmful contracting; Kish Parella, Protecting Third-Parties in Contract, 58 AM. BUS. L. J. 327
(2021 (tort liability should incorporate third-parties harmed by contract). See also sources
cited note 4, supra.
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understand it, not as a collection of wrong-headed decisions, but as justified
and durable common law.
I.

THE PARTY PRIMACY NORM

A. What Is the Party Primacy Norm?
Contract law enforces promises for many good reasons: To protect
expectation and reliance interests of promisees,11 to enhance the autonomy
and individualism of promisors by granting them the power to engage with
others and promote their own plans,12 to do justice between parties in a
reciprocal relationship who disagree over their respective claims, and of
course to increase the welfare of the parties.13 But whether one focuses on
efficiency or justice, autonomy or reciprocity, reliance or expectation, or expost versus ex-ante concerns, common justifications for the existing rules
often circle back to the parties in the transaction. This is the party primacy
norm.
Contract law helps the parties, not outsiders, achieve cooperation. It
protects interests, plans, and well-being of the parties, not of others. When
it operates to remove ambiguity over the terms of the contract—for
example, by interpreting and constructing the terms or providing gapfillers—contract law looks at the interests, the implied intent, and the
conduct of the parties as the guiding criterion. Even the exceptions—like
the third-party beneficiaries doctrine—are justified because the parties so
designated them. (At this point, we’ll stop italicizing parties, but please feel
free to read with that emphasis in mind.)
To be sure, contract law is a machinery run by the collective, and it
is therefore constrained not to offend collective interests. Agreements the
parties make and jointly favor may not be serviced by contract law when
they harm society or unduly burden courts. The party primacy norm
therefore is restrained by substantive boundaries from numerous other
areas of law, primarily public law, and has also some internal mandatory
guardrails.
One of the primary illustrations of the party primacy norm is the
contract interpretation doctrine. “The primary purpose and function of the
court in interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’
intention” says Williston, because “the cardinal principle of contract
interpretation is that the intention of the parties must prevail.”14 On this
L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE. L.J.
52 (1936); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1985).
12 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE ch. 2 (1981).
13 Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 23 (1989).
14 Lord, supra note 114. See also In re Motors Liquidation Co., 460 B.R. 603 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Hunt, Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1277 (2d
11
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matter, even his contrarian, Corbin, easily concurs.15 The field of contract
law has long debated how exactly to find the parties’ intent, how much
extrinsic evidence to bring to bear in this inquiry, and whether to trim
intent’s sails by using objective measures (as in—what might a reasonable
party in this situation intend). But these debates are typically framed by the
party primacy norm: none of the positions on proper interpretation,
construction, or gap-filling in contracts proposes that courts should look
beyond the goal, interests, and manifestations of the contracting parties.
When courts do look to broader context, such as trade usage, they do so as
a heuristic for what the parties presumptively intend.16 Textualists and
contextualists may disagree on what information should courts access in
interpreting and enforcing contractual promises and representations, but
they agree that the enterprise should serve the parties’ interests.17
The party primacy norm operates at different levels of generality.
At the zoomed-in end, courts have in mind these specific parties when
giving meaning to the contract. Zooming out, courts contemplate parties
like these. For example, court might disagree which trade usages and customs
are valid evidence for what the parties intended. Because trade usages
require courts to identify the relevant trade community and the generality
of the custom, defining the scope of a community and incidence of
regularity may dictate the result. Exempting new entrants or out-of-town
merchants from the dictates of local usages could be justified when these
outsiders would not ordinarily know the usage.18 These kinds of exemptions
import a more specific conception of the party primacy norm, closer to
actual, rather than constructed, intent.
B. Justifying the Party Primacy Norm

Cir.1989)). See also Bagchi, supra note 10 (“For different reasons, scholars from both
philosophical and economic perspectives are drawn to an insular picture of contract
interpretation focused exclusively on the parties to contract.”).
15 5 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.23 (2021).
16 See JAMES J. WHITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 47 (4th
ed. 1995) (past practices are relevant “to determine ‘the meaning of the agreement’ in the
first place). UCC § 2-202 cmt.2 identifies the past practices doctrines as means for assuring
that “the true understanding of the parties as the agreement will be reached.” See also Zamir,
The Inverted Hierarchy, supra note 10, at 1765-67.
17 Textualists believe that sophisticated parties who already “embed[ded] as much or as
little of the context as they wish in a written, integrated contracts.” See Ronald J. Gilson,
Charles F. Sabel and Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract
Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 26 (2014). Contextualists, in contrast, favor review of
extrinsic evidence to more fully trace “the parties’ real relationship” and advance the
“parties’ efforts to govern their transactions efficiently.” Id. at 27.
18 Compare Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162 (2d
Cir. 1979) (entrant not bound by trade usage), with Berwick & Smith Co. v. Salem Press,
117 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1954) (party new in the trade bound by trade usage).
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The party primacy norm, as its name suggests, puts parties first—
often sidelining those not in the deal.
This section discusses the literature’s two primary justifications for
why the norm sidelines nonparties. The first justification is normative:
courts are not well-suited institutionally to account for the interests of
people not represented in the litigation. The second is pragmatic: even were
courts judicious when blending in nonparty interests, the contracting parties
could opt out and undo the protection given to the interests of others.
Establishing these justifications serves as a backdrop to also
understand their limits and in turn explore, later in the article, the surprising
prevalence of nonparty interests in contract law and their systematic
appearance.
1. Institutional Competence
Contract law instructs courts to identify the bargain between the
parties and enforce it.19 Because so much of contract law is developed caseby-case, based on records developed by the litigating parties, one
justification of the party primary norm is that courts simply see too small
and random of a sliver of society’s problems to capably look out for the
interests of non-parties.20
Of course, there are many reasons to agree that courts are not the
best institution to account for the interests of non-parties and of society at
large. Their shortcomings are fundamentally due to two factors: the
information courts have and their prerogative to determine or arbitrate
among social preferences.21
First, nonparty interests are varied and many. Courts are therefore
unlikely to recognize the full array of affected interests and the full
magnitude of such effects. Common law courts are procedurally and
practically restricted to evaluate claims raised and argued by the parties and
are therefore exposed to the parties’ (potentially conflicting) interests, as
well as to the social interests that the parties choose strategically to plead.
For example, when a coal mine advocates for specific performance of its
breached long-term sale-of-coal contract, imploring the court to account
for not only lost profits but also the surrounding nonparty interests such as
the livelihood of its workers and the entire local community, this litigant is
choosing selectively which social value to highlight. Other non-party
interests—like the negative environmental impact of coal-based energy, or
Lord, supra note 114; and MURRAY, supra note 15, § 24.23.
Cathy Hwang, Faux Contracts, 104 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1068 (2019) (noting that relatively
few contracts result in dispute and relatively few disputes end up in court).
21 See also Bagchi, supra note 10 at 229-36. Bagchi’s analysis addresses a similar question—
when common law courts are less suited to address societal harms. Bagchi organizes her
insights along the distinction between concentrated and diffuse nonparty interests.
19
20
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the economic impact on suppliers of alternative sources of fuel—remain
obscure in the litigation, especially if they are geographically or temporally
remote, or have a less concrete and salient manifestation. If contract law
wanted to account for specific non-party interests or for diffuse social
impact, some of the affected interests would likely receive less than
adequate representation in the litigation.
Second, nonparty interests are complex. Courts adjudicating
contractual disputes have a difficult enough job accounting for the private
interests involved, the objectives of the parties, their specific circumstances,
the practices followed by transactors in such markets, and how to weigh
these various instructions. Significant litigation costs are poured into
assessment of such aspects. But the sources and records that establish the
parties’ interests are insufficient and even irrelevant for the task of
measuring the anticipated impact on broader nonparty interests.22 Indeed,
in regulatory theory, a primary reason to use ex ante formulation of rules is
the ability of agencies promulgating such commands to collect more
information, to survey the interests involved and their intensity, to measure
the potential impact of any regime, and to rationally choose the degree of
precision or complexity of the rules.23 Because legislation is “supported by
facilities for factual investigation and can be more responsive to the general
public” it is widely accepted that the declaration of public policies and
setting priorities among them are largely the province of legislators.24 The
expertise needed to assess cost and benefit, the various harms and their
expected magnitudes, and the arsenal of policy tools to address them, are
concentrated within specialized branches of government, not among judges
and their clerks.
Third, nonparty interests are also political. Is it the role of courts to
determine which social interest to favor, especially when competing
interests collide? In other areas of law, courts are accustomed to promoting
particular societal values, but they often implementing priorities established
explicitly by legislators (or, the Framers!). In the common law of contracts,
by contrast, explicit legislative guidance is more rarely available.25 Courts
may try to resolve contractual disputes in a manner that appears social, for
example when they justify a decision to avoid “social waste.”26 But what
Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Limits of Public Contract Law, __ LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. __ (forthcoming 2022). (“the costs inherent in adapting contract law to
this new public role outweigh any likely benefits.”) (manuscript on file with authors).
23 See generally Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. &
ECON. ch 2 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 1997); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation
of Safety, 13 J. Legal. Stud. 357 (1984). More specifically, see Mark A. Cohen and Paul H.
Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. REG. 167, 187 (1985), the technical
requirements in regulating auto safety.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 179 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1979).
25 The Uniform Commercial Code is an obvious counter-example, though jurisdictions
like California in fact have codified many contract law rules outside of the sale-of-goods
context as well.
26 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963).
22
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they view as “social waste” could well reflect controversial values, selective
norms, and empirical guesswork. When, in this context, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court famously chose a specific measure of damages for breach a
promise to restore strip-mined land, it measured “social waste” narrowly,
as reflected in market prices, ignoring not only non-pecuniary values but
also the impact of the chosen remedy on the environment.27 It is only when
legislators enshrined nonparty environmental interests in a statute that
courts followed the guidance, abandoned the narrow conception of “social
waste,” and opted to award damages that account for broader social
impact.28 Without such legislative guidance—if, hypothetically, a court
refuses to enforce a building sale because of the concern about to the
buyer’s intended polluting use—the power of a polity to democratically
advance, prioritize, and put predictable order into its societal policies would
be undermined.29
Fourth, the regulation of nonparty interests must be comprehensive
for it to yield its intended benefits. A court is unlikely to be able to make
such a sweeping rule using only the facts at hand in a particular case. At
best, courts manage to address a particular manifestation of the nonparty
interest at stake. But when the concrete effort relates to a broader
underlying interest such as public safety or health, economic growth, or
environmental protection, a token success in the litigation outcome could
do little to promote the greater goal. For example, when courts interpret
auto insurance contracts, they might hope to advance the social goal of a
broad compensatory net for auto accident victims, including nonparties to
the insurance policy. But creating a broad social insurance requires more
information than courts typically have, more planning in addressing its
various manifestations, and consistency in the application of specific
commands. Without expert engineering of the scheme, it is unlikely to have
intended magnitude of impact on the social interest and could inadvertently
inflict unintended costs.
Fifth, regulation of nonparty interests through common law
innovations needs to account for contracting parties’ response when they
subsequently revise their contracts. Courts must anticipate dynamic effects
and have little more than their intuition to guide them. We will show, for
example, that courts take nonparty interests into account in adjudicating
insurance disputes, but of course insurers are often quick to respond by
redrafting insurance policies to neutralizes the judicial intervention.30
Id.
Rock Island Improv. Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, 698 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1983).
For similar cases pointing to legislative developments in choosing cost of completion
damages, see Davis v. Shell Oil Co., 795 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Schneberger v.
Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994); Miller v. C.K.L., Inc., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS
4069 (Ct. App. 1988).
29 See Bagchi, supra note 10, at 230-31.
30 See, generally, Daniel Schwarcz, The Role of Courts in the Evolution of Form Contracts: An
Insurance Case Study, 46 BYU L. REV. 471 (2021).
27
28
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Finally, judicial efforts to promote nonparty interests could beget
contract law rules that are less predictable. The rules of contract
construction, for example, would become more complex and harder to
anticipate ex ante.31 Different judges may subscribe to different social
visions and may reach different priorities among the social interests and in
balancing them against the private interests of the parties.32
Of course, common law method is relatively unpredictable until
precedents form to provide guidance and yield predictability. But the
consistency needed for such convergence may be elusive, given the
multitude of relevant nonparty interests and the likely disagreements about
their weight.
For these reasons, many have argued that the primary institutional
place to identify and advance non-party interests and make social impact
policies effectively is the legislature and not courts.33 Courts themselves say
this.34 Indeed, the institutional adequacy concerns sometimes drive courts
to explicitly reject non-party interests in contract law. For example, when a
court has to interpret a labor agreement and decide if a plant closing is
permitted, it would reject a claim that keeping the plant open is good for
the local community. As one court explained, “in the view of this court,
formulation of public policy on the great issues involved in plant closings
and removals is clearly the responsibility of the legislatures of the states or
of the Congress of the United State.”35 When, on the other hand, a
legislature has already spoken and has enshrined a particular nonparty
interest, courts are willing to subjugate the treatment of the contract to that
interest.36
2. Opting Out of Nonparty Defaults
Casey and Niblett, supra note 22, at 9 (judicial intervention ex post is too haphazard to
give parties guidance on how to account for nonparty interests, ex ante); see generally,
Kaplow, supra note 23, at 505 (“More precise laws tend to be desirable as long as
information is not prohibitively costly for actors to obtain.”); See also Louis Kaplow, The
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995).
32
Indeed, in asbestos litigation, for example, a judicial approach to define the term
“occurrence” in insurance contracts in a manner that maximizes insurance coverage and
provides more social compensation for nonparties has been criticized and described as
“judicial legislation,” “inconsistent,” and “result oriented.” Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F.Supp 1485, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
33 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
34 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35 United Steel Workers of America v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir.
1980).
36 Rock Island Improv. Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, 698 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The
statute declares today, as it did in 1967, that the operator of a strip mine has a duty to
reclaim the land and that the state may contract for the work to be done if the operator
defaults. The statute makes no exception for cases in which the expenditures for
reclamation are disproportionate to the resulting increase in value of the land.”).
31
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Another justification for the party primacy norm that that parties
can re-assert the primacy of their own interests by contracting around
defaults that do not advance their interests.
Contract law consists almost entirely of default rules—commands
that the parties can disclaim in the contract.37 These are the gap-fillers
supplied by statutes when a contract is incomplete, the interpretive rules
used by courts to supplement the meaning of ambiguous terms, the
remedies for breach of a contract, and rules governing circumstances in
which a contract is excused.38 The primary normative criterion prescribes
rules that maximize the surplus from the parties’ relationship.39 These rules
provide content to the parties’ transaction where needed, and to succeed
they have to mimic what the parties would have chosen, or else they would
be written out.
While this approach neglects many other valuable conceptions of
merit, it has an aura of inevitability. Any attempt to promote objectives
other than the joint welfare of the contracting parties (or that of the drafting
party), if pursued via default rules, would be futile. The parties can and do
opt out and reinstate in their contracts the party primacy provisions.40
In a world in which courts advance nonparty interests, parties may
not easily opt out ex ante because of the difficulty to predict the type of
interests that will be promoted. (This is related to the problem of courts
having to select among many competing non-party interests.) Against this
backdrop—where courts behave erratically and parties are unable to adjust
for that unpredictability, ex post opt out provides additional escape hatch.
Told to perform the contract in a manner that does not maximize their joint
surplus, the parties can still undo this command by renegotiation. Once the
court enforces a version of the contract that advance some nonparty
interest, the problem of predicting the default vanishes and the parties can
surgically opt out, ex post, and divide among them the added gain. Such
settlements, even if reached after a court judgment, are generally
enforceable.
It is immediately apparent that the problem of opt out creates an
important limit on courts’ ability to advance nonparty interests via default
rules. We will see later, in Part II, that courts quite often try to do this. For
Omri Ben-Shahar, Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009).
Id.
39 Id. at 396-97 (noting that “parties’ will . . . are best served by default rules that maximize
the contractual surplus.”). See also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 486 (4th ed. 2004)
(courts may provide terms “that an economist would describe as maximizing the expected
value of the transaction”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99 (7th
ed. 2007) (“[C]ontract law cannot readily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency, as
a ruling that fails to interpolate the efficient term will be reversed by the parties in their
subsequent dealings”).
40 For a critical account documenting the vast opt-out phenomenon, see MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHT, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2013).
37
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example, courts often interpret insurance contracts in a manner that affords
more coverage dollars to innocent victims of the policyholder. What stops
insurers from redrafting the insurance policies to eliminate the ambiguity
that allows courts to interpret them and advance nonparty interests?41 In
some states, such changes must be approved by regulators, and any
redrafting that reduces coverage may be blocked.42 But also, policyholders,
especially those without assets who purchase liability insurance to satisfy
regulatory requirements, might be happy to pay lower premiums reflecting
the redrafted broader exclusions, since the impact of such opt outs would
be felt primarily by their victims. And insurers—more than any other
contracting industry—should be able to calculate the actuarial savings from
such opt outs and marshal their drafting genius to make the necessary
changes in the contracts.
Indeed, insurers have at times done exactly that—redraft standard
insurance policies to narrow down the benefit courts sought to secure for
nonparties. For example, courts expanded coverage under the liability
coverage in homeowners’ insurance to compensate victims of domestic
violence. Harms from such intentional acts are usually excluded under the
policies, but courts gradually chiseled an expansion of coverage by
reinterpreting what counts as “intentional.”43 Courts did that explicitly to
benefit victims, viewing them as highly deserving impacted nonparties.
Unsatisfied with these results, insurers added “criminal acts” exclusions to
their policies, restoring the broad exclusion and erasing the nonparty
benefit.44 Similarly, when courts, through interpretation of commercial
liability insurance policies, expanded coverage for environmental harms to
include expenditures on pollution remediation, insurers responded by
drafting aggressive pollution exclusions.45
This same dynamic—parties renegotiating the terms to trump
courts’ deference to societal concerns—was imagined by Judge Posner as a
reason not to issue an order of specific performance, advocated for by the
plaintiff as the remedy necessary to advance the interests of non-parties
(who would benefit from the continued performance of the contract). “[I]t
is unlikely that an order of specific performance, if made, would ever
actually be implemented” predicted Judge Posner. The parties “can both be
See, generally, Daniel Schwarcz, The Role of Courts in the Evolution of Form Contracts: An
Insurance Case Study, 46 BYU L. Rev. 471 (2021) (demonstrating how insurers redraft
standard policies in response to court decisions).
42 Even when revisions are approved, the new language requires interpretation, introducing
further ambiguity. The specter of uncertainty may chill insurers’ incentives to redraft. See
Michelle E. Boardman, The Unpredictability of Insurance Interpretation, 82 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 27, 29 (2019) (describing the difficulty of redrafting insurance terms).
43 PICO v. Swanson 569 NE 2d 906; Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603; Farmers
Insurance v. Hastings, 366 N.W.2d 293.
44 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
441 (5th ed. 2012) (Courts interpret the term caused intentionally “to further the public policy
of providing financial relief for the victims of torts.”).
45 Id., at 511-17.
41
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made better off by negotiating a cancellation of the contract and with it a
dissolution of the order of specific performance.”46
For these reasons—the prevalence of ex-ante or ex-post opt-outs—
laws that seek to advance nonparty interests which conflict with the jointwelfare-maximization of the parties would usually have to utilize regulatory
techniques other than default rules, either by making opt out very costly or
by prohibiting it altogether. Indeed, as we briefly review next, mandatory
rules have long been recognized as the primary method by which contract
law advances nonparty interests, and yet the dissatisfaction with such stiff
limits to contractual freedom has bred greater support for sticky defaults.
C. Some Traditional Limits to the Party Primacy Norm
We presented the party primacy norm as a fundamental principle of
contract law and offered justifications for its universality. The remainder of
this article attempts to chip away at this pillar. We begin this undoing here,
by noting several widely recognized and obvious “exceptions” to the party
primacy norm.
We group these existing exceptions into three categories:
mandatory guardrails, parties like these, and third-party beneficiaries.
Mandatory guardrails set boundaries for permissible contracting, and often
do so to limit negative effects on nonparties. Rules tailored for parties like
these capture the ex ante approach to dispute resolution, whereby courts
decide cases with an eye to how the precedents would impact other likely
situated parties in future transactions. And third-party beneficiaries doctrine
allow nonparties to enforce contracts to which they are not parties. These
exceptions allow courts to capture the interests of those who are not party
to the contract.
1. Mandatory Guardrails
Contract law usually enforces agreements that comply with the
formation rules without regard to their substance, but up to a limit. It does
not enforce contracts against public policy—a broad category that primarily
includes illegal conduct and transactions that categorically reduce social
welfare.47 These lines of permissible activity are typically drawn by other
substantive areas of law, and limits on enforceable contracts is but one of
the tools necessary to achieve their goals. For example, in many
jurisdictions, selling one’s own kidneys is deemed impermissible—and so is
child labor, prostitution, and trading in illegal substances.48
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279 (7th Cir. 1986).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8, intro. note (AM. L. INST. 1981).
48
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Economics & Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL. & L. 57 (1989) (describing the laws that outlaw trade in human organs, and
arguing that it may be possible to design a system in which human or cadaver organs are
46
47
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Many of these mandatory guardrails are established because of a
concern for nonparty interests, often to protect a diffuse social interest. In
fact, concern about externalities is a primary theoretical basis for limits on
freedom of contract.49 The legal landscape is full of such mandatory limits,
originating from the laws that regulate dangerous activities. Criminal law
protects social order and the safety of potential victims of crime, and thus
a criminal conspiracy punishable and, obviously, unenforceable. Antitrust
laws protect consumer welfare, zoning laws promote optimal land use,
environmental law limits pollution, child welfare laws guarantee minimum
security to children. Contracts to cartelize, misuse, pollute, and abuse harm
nonparties and violate public policies, and are thus unenforceable under
contract law, if not otherwise illegal.50
Even in the absence of explicit legislative prohibitions, contract law
has a blanket rule that allowing courts to refuse enforcement of agreements
that violate public interests. Courts are invited to exercise discretion to
“protect some aspect of the public welfare.”51 Whether such limits to
contracting are “purely the product of the judicial development”52 or
influenced and motivated by existing legislation, they address harmful
conduct not expressly prohibited by the statutes. For example, common
law courts have historically developed limits on restraints of trade
(including activity not prohibited by antitrust laws), impairment of family
relations, and promises to commit a tort.53 In addition, specific contract law
enactments, like Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code which governs
contracts for the sale of goods, include mandatory guardrails. For example,
under UCC 2-719(3), an agreement to limit a consumer’s damages for
personal injury is “prima facie unconscionable” and thus unenforceable. 54
Such exemptions from tort liability have the potential to affect not only the
well-being of the contracting consumer, but the overall safety of products
traded in a way that is ethically sound and a marked improvement over an outright ban on
trade); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in BABY MARKETS:
MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES (Michelle Bratcher Goodwin
ed., 2010) (describing the extralegal world of baby selling); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Egg Donor
Price Fixing and Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 16 VIRTUAL
MENTOR: AMER. MED. ASSOC. J. ETHICS 57 (2014) (describing oocyte donation, the laws
and regulations that surround compensation of donors, and a case in challenging limits on
compensation as illegal price-fixing).
49 Various justifications typically underlie mandatory rules in contract law, including the
protection of weak parties who lack sufficient information or cognitive skills. One of the
central justifications—“externalities”—is the concern with the effect of the bargain on
nonparties. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Debates over Freedom of Contract in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989); Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulatory Techniques in
Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
109, 115 (2013).
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178(1) & cmt. A (AM. L. INST. 1981).
51 Id. § 179(b).
52 Id. at ch. 8, intro. note.
53 Id. §§ 186, 189, 192.
54 U.C.C. § 2-710(3) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
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in the market. Similar mandatory limits on exculpatory clauses have been
developed by common law courts for contracts not governed by the UCC. 55
The nonparty interests protected by courts can have a public good
aspect. Consider the nonenforceability of noncompete clauses and
nondisclosure agreements in employment contracts. These restraints were
relatively rare in the past but have become much more common in present
times, and recent estimates suggest that over half of American employees
sign nondisclosure agreements and a similar percentage sign noncompetes,
even in relatively low-wage industries.56 Overall, noncompetes and
nondisclosure agreements may decrease overall wages, reduce the
information workers have about firms, and increase harassment and law
breaking that, absent these restraints, would be deterred.57 A party who
accepts such clauses may be rewarded in other ways and may not be
specifically harmed by their inclusion, but when the practice prevails among
the labor force, all are worse off. Because each individual contract
contributes only trivially to these systemic effects, it is unlikely that a judge
would have the basis or competence to determine that this contract had
occasioned significant externalities. In such public good scenario, policing
is generally left to legislatures, which are increasingly willing to prohibit
both nondisclosure and noncompete clauses in the public’s interest.58
It is commonly thought a contract becomes unenforceable on
grounds of mandatory public policy if it harms nonparty interests at the time
of the contract formation.59 But not necessarily so. Contracts that seem valid and
legal may become unenforceable if subsequent circumstances render their
performance socially harmful. Such limit to contractual obligation is in line
with a central methodology of contract law, which implies certain limits to
less-than-fully-specified contractual rights. Such limits are usually implied
from standards of reasonable behavior, good faith, or commercial norms,60
and are part of every contract. These limits are ordinarily justified in
accordance with the parties’ expectations, but they also emerge from
nonparty interests.
For example, a recent paper suggested that emergent threats to
public health (like Covid) could provide grounds for mandatory limits on

See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 98 (Cal. 1963); Broadley v.
Mashpee Neck Marina, Inc., 471 F.3d 272 (1st Cir. 2006); See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 195 (AM. L. INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER
CONTRACTS § 5(c) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft 2019); Walter Gelhorn, Contracts and
Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
56 David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 191
(2019).
57 Jason Sockin et al., Non-Disclosure Agreements and Externalities from Silence,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3900285 (Jan. 20, 2022).
58 Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 56, at 187–89.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt d (AM. L. INST. 1981).
60 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305, 2-306 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
55
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the enforcement of otherwise permissible terms.61 The classic example is
the 1918 case of Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Association, in which parties
contracted to “promote and manage a baby show” where “babies were in
some manner to be exhibited.”62 Public policy did not oppose such shows
in principle, but when the polio epidemic struck, the court rescinded the
contract so as to protect public health. This was not an exercise in contract
interpretation, nor was the decision based on the parties’ interests. Rather,
the court viewed performance in the evolving conditions as dangerous and
exercised the discretion it has to refuse enforcement of “immoral”
contracts or other socially harmful activity.63
Interestingly, the dissent in this case invoked a version of the
institutional competence argument against this exercise of discretion by the
court. Accounting for specific public health threats requires evidence and
expertise beyond that of a contract law court, intruding on the legislative
domain.64
2. Parties Like These
In addition to mandatory guardrails, contract law also considers
another category of nonparty interests—those of future typical transactors
in similar circumstances. This is the conventional ex ante orientation of legal
rules and precedents—justifying a command that might not be the optimal
for the present dispute by its good effects on an entire class of cases that
will be governed by it.
In asking how a decision in a case would affect parties like these,
courts sometimes engage in analysis of incentives. How would future
parties’ behavior be shaped by the rule? If, say, a remedy for breach of
contract covers some losses but not others, how would it affect parties’
incentives to make reliance investments? Courts may choose a certain
damage measure to advance such forward social interests, even when the
result in the particular case mis-compensates a party and appears unfair or
violates a strict criterion of make-whole damages.65
Similarly, courts examine how their decision would affect the
overall contracting environment, the costs of entering contracts, and the
stability of the market. For example, a remedy of specific performance
could be justified because of the danger that, if other suppliers similarly
breached and only paid damages, the market for the end product would
Hoffman & Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, supra note 6.
Hanford v. Conn. Fair Ass’n, 103 A. 838 (Conn. 1918).
63 Id. Notably, the Hanford court stated that were the plaintiff to show that gathering babies
posed no health risks—social distancing, 1916-style—it could still potentially recover
damages. Id.
64 Hanford, 103 A. at 839 (Beach, J., dissenting).
65 U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977); Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d
471 (1992).
61
62
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collapse. “The breach of the contract by one planter differs but in degree
from a breach by all.”66 The social impact of a one-time decision is
negligible; but when multiplied over the numerous such transactions, the
overall impact on parties likes these becomes measurable and central to a
court’s decision.
Or, to take another common dilemma, would a liberal parol
evidence rule, which allows the court to consider extrinsic evidence beyond
the four corners the written contract, help or disrupt future contracting
environments? This specific dilemma—whether to ignore extrinsic
evidence regarding the parties’ unwritten intent—demonstrates the
potential conflict between the party primacy norm and nonparty interests.
Advocates of a party-primacy approach would like courts to be receptive to
more evidence so as to more accurately vindicate the parties’ intent.67 In
contrast, the focus on non-parties—on future transactors facing similar
disputes regarding the existence of oral understandings—drives many
courts to justify their exclusive focus on the formal contracts as a way to a
way to increase certainty and reduce litigation costs.68 Indeed, a landmark
case like California’s Masterson v. Sine offers a dramatic confrontation
between the two views.69
This concern with the interests of parties like these is fundamental
in every area of contract law: whether to enforce preliminary
understandings,70 when to strike down one-sided fine-print terms,71 under

Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831 (Ch. 1907).
Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and
Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1444-45 (2016).
68 See, e.g., Residential Mkt. Group, Inc. v. Granite Inv. Group, 933 F.2d 546, 548 (7th Cir.
1991) (“There is an eternal tug of war between giving the parties to a contract a right to
testify to what they in fact meant . . . and preventing one party from depriving the other
of the protection of the written contract . . . . Desire for certainty and predictability,
perhaps combined with some distrust of juries, has resulted in a presumption that the judge
will try to puzzle out the meaning of the contract without recourse to inevitably selfserving, often protracted, and typically inconclusive oral testimony.” (Posner, J.)).
69 68 Cal. 2d 222 (1968), where the majority believed that a liberal interpretive approach
would better implement the goals of the present parties, whereas the dissent focused on
the harmful effect to future parties, worried that the holding “materially lessens the reliance
which may be placed upon written instruments affecting the title to real estate […] and
opens the door, albeit unintentionally to a new technique for the defrauding of creditors.”
Id. at 231.
70 Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989); Dixon v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011). For legal scholarship examine
how precontractual liability affects incentives to invest in profitable opportunities and to
enter negotiations, see Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 481 (1996); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar,
Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001).
71 William v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Danaher, J.,
dissenting).
66
67
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what circumstances an offer becomes irrevocable,72 what rituals constitute
an acceptance of shrinkwrap terms,73 whether a party in breach ought to
receive any remuneration for partial performance, and more. Consider this
last issue—often arising in a context in which an employee or subcontractor
quits midway through the performance of the contract and seeks to recover
partial pay. Common law courts have historically disagreed on this matter, 74
but have always justified their views not only by reference to justice between
the parties but also by the effect of the rule on parties like these—how labor
markets would be affected by a partial compensation rule. In the 200-year
old classic case of Britton v. Turner, the court speculated that denial of any
recovery to the breaching employee would be socially harmful, giving an
unscrupulous employer the “temptation to . . . drive the laborer from his
service, near the close of his term, by ill treatment.”75 Other courts reached
the counter result, downplaying the make-the-worker-miserable argument
and focusing instead on the ability of employers to assemble a stable team
of laborers.76 And, recognizing that the any remedial is merely a default
rules, courts noted how parties could always “by apt and certain words”
contract out of it.77 Indeed, courts often expect and intend for parties like
these to opt out, for example when applying the contra proferentum approach
to interpretation of insurance contracts. It is the recognition that future
parties with drafting sophistication could draft a clearer contract that drives
courts to specifically create incentives for redrafting.78
In short, courts and commentators routinely engage in this type of
ex-ante analysis—how a legal command affects incentives and how it thus
regulates behavior of like parties in the market. When done in the context
of an existing dispute, the analysis not only looks to the future, it also
envisions a population of typical parties with typical interests and looks
beyond the possibly atypical interests of the present litigants.
Now, as every law student who sat through 1L contracts knows,
this armchair theorizing about the incentive effects of particular decisions
on future transactors and forecasting the equilibrium effects of opting out
of rules, will often lead to indeterminate discussions. In fact, so vulnerable
are courts’ predictions to critique that it is fair to ask if they really are any
better at this task than they are at advancing larger social agendas. Is the
advancement of the interests of parties like these equally subject to
institutional competence objections as that of nonparties writ large? This
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409 (1958) (noting that the goal of inducing
reliance can contribute to an irrevocable offer).
73 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that additional terms can
become part of contract to reduce transactions costs at formation stage).
74 Compare Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267 (1824), with Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
75 Britton, 6 N.H. at 494.
76 Stark, 19 Mass. 267; Robert Gordon, Britton v. Turner: A Signpost on the Crooked Road to
“Freedom” in the Employment Contract, in CONTRACT STORIES (Douglas Baird ed., 2007).
77 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921)
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
72
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was in broad strokes the point that Duncan Kennedy made more than forty
years ago—and, well, he had a point.79
That said, there is one notable difference between the institutional
competence arguments made about concern for parties like these and the
more expansive civic orientation we defend later in the article. Where courts
forecast the effects of their decisions on future commercial participants in
markets adjacent to the ones under review, they are at least informed by the
current preferences of the parties in those markets who are litigants in the
case. This may result in fewer commercially surprising errors.
3. Third-Party Beneficiaries
Another apparent limit to the party primacy norm relates to thirdparty beneficiaries. Contract doctrine permits non-parties who are the
intended beneficiaries of contracts by others to initiate enforcement and
remedial actions.80 This, of course, is not an exception to the party primacy
norm, since the third-party beneficiary rules merely provide mechanics to
“effectuate the intention of the parties.”81 In other words, while third-party
beneficiaries may have rights, standing to sue, and their own remedies,
those are created by the intent of the parties to the contract, thus once again
anchoring the doctrine around the party primacy norm.
The idea that rights of third-party beneficiaries exist only when the
contracting parties intend them is further reflected in cases involving
government contracts. Government contracts benefit the public, but unless
clearly stated otherwise, individual nonparties are generally viewed as
“incidental” beneficiaries of such contracts who are not entitled to the
third-party beneficiary rights.82 It is only when a contract involving the
governmental manifests a specific intent to give individual members of the
public enforceable rights to compensation for its breach that such nonparty
remedial rights arise.83
II.

NONPARTY DEFAULTS

We ended Part I by identifying pockets of deviations from the party
primacy norm—exceptions to the axiom that the sole goal of contract law
is the advancement of the parties’ interests. Come to think of it, theses
exceptions are entirely unexceptional, and in fact reinforce the dominance
of the party primacy norm. True, mandatory guardrails do protect interests
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
80 Id. at ch. 14. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1358 (1993); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third Party Beneficiaries and Contractual
Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 326 (2015).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
82 Id. § 315 cmt a.
83 Berberich v. U.S., 5 Cl. Ct. 652 (1984), judgment aff’d, 770 F.2d 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
79
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of nonparties, but they are largely foreign implants within contract law. That
you cannot enforce a contract to murder is not a rule of contract law; it is a
by-product of a prohibition originating in criminal law. And rules that serve
the interests of “parties like these” can be thought of as an ex-ante
embodiment of the party primacy norm, which is to say that they advance
a version of the party primacy norm in which the conception of a “party”
is a stereotype. Likewise, third-party beneficiary rules implement an
extensive conception of parties’ interests, which includes their deliberate
wishes to benefit others.
We now come to heart of this article, and what we see as a real
exception to the party primacy norm—ways in which courts advance
interests of nonparties without direct prohibition or command from other
areas of law, and do so in a non-mandatory fashion, using the traditional
mainstream techniques of the common law of contracts. We identify a
variety of default rules, canons of interpretation and construction, remedial
approaches, and other doctrinal tweaks that promote the diffuse interests
of other members of society. We call these nonparty defaults.
This Part of the article is dedicated to a survey of such nonparty
defaults. It is a proof of concept, intended to highlight the existence of this
regulatory technique, an exception to the party primacy norm that has
previously not received much attention. Later, in part III, we try to reconcile
the proven existence of nonparty defaults with our earlier discussion of the
justifications to the party primacy norm. How do these rules, that promote
nonparty interests in a non-mandatory fashion, survive the problems of
institutional competence and opt-out?
In researching the instances of nonparty defaults across contract
law, we discovered that many emerge from interpretation and construction
of contracts.84 We therefore begin this trans-doctrinal survey in part II.A
with a general illustration of how non-party interests imbue these doctrines.
Part II.B then focuses on the most intense application of nonparty
interests—in the interpretation of liability insurance contracts. Part II.C
examines another major junction of nonparty interests—the gap-filler
remedies courts award for breach of contract. Finally, part III.D suggests
that the scope of certain defenses is sometimes shaped by nonparty interests
and illustrates this practice via decisions to excuse the performance of a
contract that endangers the public.
A. Nonparty Interests as a Canon of Interpretation

“Interpretation” refers to a search for the meaning the parties gave to the language used,
whereas “construction” refers to doctrines courts use in determining the legal operation
and consequences of the contract (which begins, but does not end, with interpretation).
See MURRAY, supra note 15, § 24.3. For simplicity, we will refer henceforth to both practices
as “interpretation.”
84
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We said earlier that at the heart of interpretation doctrine sits the
party primacy norm. So deeply engrained is the importance of specific
intent that courts and hornbooks will often state that enforcement of
contracts must be loyal to such manifested intent, even if it is senseless or
capricious.85 The entire apparatus of figuring out which performance
obligations arise from the agreement seems to start and end with what the
parties intended, a task that consumes most of the energy of commercial
contract litigation.
And yet the contract sometimes affects nonparties, in ways to which
courts will attend. This is most obviously the case where one of the parties
is the government itself, and a particular interpretative choice will affect the
public fisc, or the social welfare aspects that the specific government branch
regulates. The First Restatement of Contracts collected cases in this vein
and summarized them in a provision on “secondary rules aiding application
of standards of interpretation” stating that “Where a public interest is
affected an interpretation is preferred which favors the public.”86
At the time, numerous cases supported this nonparty-interests
interpretation canon, including many that reached the United States
Supreme Court, involving contract rights of local governments. Prominent
examples involved projects in which municipalities granted private parties
licenses to profitably operate ferry lines, bridges, or other utilities. Should
the licenses be interpreted to provide exclusivity and to bar the municipality
from licensing a competing service? For example, in Proprietors of Charles
River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge,87 the owners of the Charles River
Bridge (who paid regular sums to Harvard College) sought to interpret their
contract with the government to prohibit construction of an adjacent bridge
that would decrease their toll revenue. The Supreme Court rejected their
position, explaining that such interpretation would undermine the very
purpose of contractual enforcement (to advance public benefits). In the
words of Justice Taney, though “the rights of private property are sacredly
guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that
the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful
preservation.”88 While the parties could have been more explicit about the
exclusivity, and have such provision enforced, their silence allowed the
court to reach an interpretive outcome not because it is what the parties
would have wanted, but “because it is in the public interest to do so.”89
A century later, a similar dispute over the exclusivity of a privately
run river crossing arrived at the Supreme Court, this time over the meaning
See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Parker, 45 N.Y. 569, 572 (1871) (a party may choose “to erect a
monument to his caprice or folly”); MURRAY, supra note 15, § 24.9 (enforce meanings
“however we may marvel at the caprice”).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236(f) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
87 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
88 Id. at 422.
89 Lord, supra note 1, at § 32:18.
85
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of an “exclusive ferry license.”90 A ferry licensee who, this time, did bargain
for an exclusivity clause, asked to court to prohibit the construction of an
adjacent bridge that would divert some of the profitable traffic. Does the
exclusivity clause apply only to competing transportation by another ferry
(the State’s position), or also by a new bridge (the licensee’s position). The
Court recognized that the implied intent at the time of entering such
contract may well have been to bar any river crossing substitute, including
a bridge, because it “would destroy the value of the ferry leases, and so
defeat the real object of the leases.”91 Relying on the Charles River Bridge case,
the Court held that to overcome an interpretation in favor of the public the
alleged meaning cannot be implied and must be explicit. An interpretation
based on the imputed business purpose of the contract does not suffice.92
Common law courts later found that the government contracts
context didn’t quite scratch the nonparty-interests itch. Accordingly, when
the Second Restatement arrived fifty years after the first, it contained a new
Section 207, standing alone and not relegated to a “secondary” theory:93
“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise
or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the
public interest is generally preferred.”
Like the Restatement’s provisions on mandatory sections relating to
unenforceability on grounds of public policy,94 the public policy
interpretation canon left for courts to determine which interests to favor
when. Somewhat surprisingly courts have not often cited Section 207, nor
have scholarly accounts examined its principle or scope.95 However, caselaw
did develop in the trajectory that that Section 207 anticipated, applying the
nonparty-interests principle as a canon of interpretation.96
For example, we earlier discussed the treatment of noncompete
clauses as an example of mandatory rules that protect nonparty interest. It
turns out that there is another way to lessen the undesirable impact of such
clauses: by determining them to be ambiguous and constructing them
narrowly. This is what the court did, for example, in interpreting a hotel
management contract that contained a 30-year restrictive covenant
prohibiting Hilton (the management company) from operating other hotels
in the city, except for their airport location.97 Later, when Hilton sought to
rebuild its airport hotel, they were alleged to be in violation of the noncompete. The court acknowledged that the new facility will increase
Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429 (1929).
Id. at 434.
92 Id. at 437.
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
94 Id. at ch. 8.
95 Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy, supra note 10 (noting this provision, while arguing that
public regarding interpretations can dampen externalities).
96 See generally MURRAY, supra note 15, § 24.25 (discussing § 207)
97 Atlanta Ctr. Ltd. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 848 F.2d 146 (11th Cir. 1988).
90
91
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competition and would therefore conflict with the purpose of the restrictive
covenant, which was “obviously intended to lessen the amount of
competition.”98 Nevertheless, the court preferred to override this basic
interpretive instinct and to follow “an important principle under Georgia
law with regard to the interpretation of contracts not to compete” which
stands for “a strong public policy disfavoring contractual restraints on
competition and trade.”99 Not a mandatory guardrail—since a clear
statement of restrictive intent would have been enforced—but rather a nonparty interests interpretation of a clause susceptible of two meanings.
Or, consider another example, concerning a non-distribution
clause. In Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, a “religious leader and arts
funding opponent” agreed, after a protracted negotiation, to sign a written
contract permitting a “rarely granted interview” with a British documentary
producer about his views “in the censorship arena.” 100 The contract
contained a non-distribution clause prohibiting the release of the interview
in other media outlets. When the producer later attempted to release the
documentary on PBS, the court viewed the non-distribution clause as
ambiguous and interpreted it so that it “should be read in a way that allows
viewership and encourages debate.”101 The interest of the public in access
to information won. (Notably, the competing public interest, in advancing
a different marketplace of ideas, which Wildmon represented, was not
weighed at all.)
A similar interpretive canon resolves disputes over the meaning of
arbitration clauses. This federal policy in favor or arbitration has been
famously busy lately, requiring state courts to enforce such agreements.102
Less noticed is how the pro-arbitration policy is advanced via contract
interpretation.103 For example, in one Title VII case the arbitration
agreement did not provide fee shifting, which is otherwise required for a
prevailing title VII plaintiff. The clause stated, “You and [Employer] shall
each bear respective costs for legal representation at any such
arbitration.”104 The employer asserted that the clause could be augmented
with a gap-filler to permit fee shifting. Recognizing that fee shifting was
probably not the intent of the drafter of the clause, the court nevertheless
noted that “the agreement does not affirmatively foreclose the possibility
Id. at 148.
Id. (“when a court is presented with a restrictive covenant that is susceptible of more
than one reasonable interpretation, the preferred interpretation is the one that least restricts
competition, thereby posing the least affront to the public policy . . . ”)
100 803 F. Supp. 1167, 1169, 1177 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
101 Id. at 1178.
102 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
103 Mastro-Buone v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1995) (arbitration
agreement that is silent or ambiguous on arbitrators’ power to grant punitive damages
ought to be interpreted with due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration).
104 Gambardella v. Pentec, Inc., 2003 WL 22119182 (D. Conn. 2003).
98
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of attorney’s fees.” Citing Section 207 of the Restatement, the court
adopted the canon that “of two competing interpretations, the one which
would read the agreement to protect [] important policy choice is the better
of the two.”105 Here, the public policy was “encouraging ameliorative
lawsuits” and promoting it dictated the default rule.
As Corbin puts it, “many additional cases can be seen in which
diverse public interests are favored in the construction of contracts.”106 In
most, the courts will first conclude that the relevant contract language is
ambiguous, giving room to choose between two or more meanings. And
the public interest then becomes, in effect, a gap-filler. These decisions
often seem to be reasoned in ad hoc ways, without a great deal of briefing
about what constitutes the public interest, or how it would be advanced.
However, there is one class of cases where these intuitions are better
worked out: insurance contracts. To it, we now turn.
B. Interpretation of Insurance Contracts
Perhaps no other class of contracts have such a pervasive and
powerful effect on third parties as liability insurance policies. Individuals
who cause significant accidental harm to others rarely have the resources to
make their victims whole. But through their auto, home, and professional
insurance policies, the compensatory interests of injured parties are
protected.107 Likewise, businesses that sell dangerous products may not
have sufficient resources to make injured customers and third parties
whole, especially if mass injuries or large diffuse social harms occur, and
only through their commercial liability policies may the harm be
compensated. Indeed, it is this concern for nonparty interests that makes
the purchase of some types of liability insurance mandatory for entry into
dangerous activities like driving or some types of manufacturing.
Even when liability insurance is required (and surely when it is not),
the contractual terms within the insurance policy are mostly nonmandatory. What harms are covered and what obligations the insurer and
policyholder have to each other are generally determined by the agreement,
subject to mandatory minima set by the law. In constructing the nonmandatory terms of liability insurance contracts, courts regularly and
explicitly view the compensatory interest of third-party victims as a
significant reason to prefer pro-coverage outcomes. This attention to the
interests on nonparties, sometimes referred to in insurance contract law as
Id. at 4.
MURRAY, supra note 15, § 24.25.
107 Many injuries in society are covered by sources other than liability insurance policies.
Primary among them are first-party life, health, and disability insurance schemes. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey O’Connell, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan
Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913 (1986) (indicating approximately 30% of benefits paid for
injuries and illnesses them from social insurance policies like social security and Medicare;
nearly 9% from tort liability; 5% from workers’ compensation).
105
106
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the “financing mechanism for tort compensation,”108 is a canon of
construction, not a mandate. It can only be unleashed if courts find some
ambiguity in the contract, and it can often be dialed down although not
eliminated by better, less ambiguous, drafting.109 In the remainder of this
section, we demonstrate primary examples of such nonparty defaults.
1. Victims of Auto Accidents.
One of the central questions in constructing auto insurance policies
is which drivers are covered, and what counts as permission to use a vehicle.
Other than the named insured, a typical omnibus clause in auto insurance
extends coverage to any person that drives the car “with the permission of
the named insured.”110 Courts are often called upon to determine what
qualifies as permission, and which non-permitted uses are covered.111 Are
drivers insured when they ignored explicit restrictions of use?112 Is there
coverage under the policy when, for example, the insured’s son permitted
a drunk friend to drive the parents’ car?113
A prominent justification for expanding coverage to include uses
that exceed or even violate the permission given by the insured is the desire
to afford more insurance dollars for auto accident victims. Under the
approach adopted in many states, known as the “Initial Permission Rule,”
TOM BAKER, KYLE D. LOGUE & CAROLYN V. WILLIAMS, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 417 (5th ed. 2021).
109
Indeed, the attention to the interests of third-party victims in contract interpretation is
discussed by courts as a general principle. See Winding Hills Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v.
North American Specialty Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 837, 840 (N.J. 2000). Accordingly, because
the interest of nonparty victims is present only in the context of liability insurance, courts
have held that precedent interpreting terms of liability insurance policies should not be
relied on to interpret terms of first-party insurance policies (where the nonparty interest
does not exist). “Unlike liability policies, where the public interest in compensation for
injured third-parties is a strong factor, in a first-party policy the extent to which insured
persons may protect themselves is a matter that rests in their own determination and
judgment.” Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Insurance
Company, 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3rd Cir. 2002).
110 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Omnibus Clause as Extending Automobile Liability Coverage to
Third Person Using Car with Consent of Permittee of Named Insured, 21 A.L.R.4th 1146 (1983).
111 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARTZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 722
(7th ed. 2020) (noting that courts generally have three approaches to determining when
users exceed the permission initially granted: “the liberal, minor deviation, and strict
approaches”).
112 For example, in Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held the insured’s son’s friend was within the coverage of an insurance policy
despite the fact that the insured owner explicitly told her son not to allow anyone else to
drive the car. 55 N.J. 542, 544 (1970). See also Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hoff., 377
N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1978) (extending coverage to the girlfriend of the insured’s son despite
clear evidence that the son received instructions not to permit anyone else to drive.)
113 See Lucas v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 113 N.J.L. 491, 492-93 (1934) (no coverage because
the policy covers only those with permission who were “give[n] such permission through
an adult member of his household”).
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expansion of coverage beyond the explicit permission granted by the
insured reflects societal interest to make the costs of road injuries more
widely spread through insurance.114 As New Hampshire Supreme court
pointed out, the rule advances policies the state’s statutory code and
“effectively furthers the state’s policy of compensating and protecting
innocent accident victims from financial disaster.”115 Maine’s highest court
explained that the rule “implements an underlying legislative policy that, for
the protection of the public, liability insurance should follow the
automobile under nearly all circumstances.”116 Leading commentators
emphasize that this is a canon of construction, not a mandate: “promoting
victim compensation may be a legitimate goal in interpreting liability
insurance contracts.”117
A similar dilemma arises in interpreting the contractual clause that
limits coverage to accidents “arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use”
of a vehicle. Courts are called upon to determine which activities and
injuries are covered. Incidents where a victim has been injured by an object
thrown from a vehicle, or entirely outside the vehicle after exiting, or during
road rage, have been found to be a “use of” the vehicle for purposes of
insurance. Here, too, a liberal approach is justified by the goal of advancing
nonparty interests. For example, the Supreme Court of Florida determined
that when a stranger attacks a driver who refuses to give him a ride, the
resulting injury to the driver arises from the use of a motor vehicle,
explaining that “[s]uch terms should be construed liberally because their
function is to extend coverage broadly.”118
The interests of accident victims is a major factor in legislation
mandating the inclusion of various cluses in auto insurance, including the
omnibus clause.119 Its protection therefore has, in some states, a mandatory
status. Since the interest is recognized in all states, the absence of a mandate
led courts to advance it through the non-mandatory interpretive canon.120
2. Mass Torts.

See, e.g., Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 546-48; Konrad v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 11 Ill. App.
2d 503, 514-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (“[I]f the original taking by the user is with the named
insured’s consent, every act of the user subsequent thereto while he is driving the vehicle
is with the named insured’s permission”). This approach is not universal. For a survey of
narrower permission construction rules adopted in certain states, including ones that do
not advance nonparty interests, see Jerry & Richmond, supra note 44, at 304-09.
115 Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 864 A.2d 368, 375 (N.H. 2005).
116 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Est. of Carey, 68 A.3d 1242, 1247 (Me. 2012).
117 See Tom BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 359 (4th ed. 2017).
118 Novak v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), approved, 453
So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1984).
119 South Carolina Code Sec. 46-750.31-.32 (Supp.1969); Wisconsin Statutes Ann. Sec.
632.32(3)(a) (“Coverage provided to the named insured applies in the same manner and
under the same provisions to any person using any motor vehicle describe in the policy”).
120 ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 385-86 (1988).
114
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Compensation of victims of mass torts requires the deep pocket of
insurers, but it must be done in conformity with the terms of standard
commercial liability insurance policies (CGLs). One of the toughest and
most heavily litigated issues in this area, which has fateful implications for
much of asbestos litigation, is a timing problem. What must happen during
the policy period for it to be “triggered” and provide coverage? Standard
liability policies cover injuries from a “bodily injury which takes place
during the policy period.” They were drafted with ordinary injuries in mind,
where the accident and the resulting harm take place almost simultaneously.
They are therefore ambiguous when applied to injuries that are
progressive—where the harm is slow to develop, manifesting years after the
original exposure—as in the case of asbestos related illnesses. Courts have
thus been called upon to give legal effect to the contract term and determine
when a latent injury “occurs.” Is it at the very early time of exposure to the
harmful product? At the much later time of the manifestation of the illness?
Or during the continuous period between exposure and illness, when the
disease resides and develops in the victim’s body?
Not surprisingly, since the insurance policy itself does not provide
a clear answer to this “trigger” questions, state courts have differed over it.
Courts have recognized that constructing the “bodily injury” language to
mean only during the period when the diseases is diagnosable would leave
many claimants without recovery, because by that late stage many insurers
inserted asbestos exclusions to the policies. By contrast, constructing it to
occur at the time of exposure and inhalation would also leave claimants
with little recovery, because at that early stage many policies had low
coverage limits.121 Some courts chose a “continuous trigger,” which makes
funds available from all policies during the entire period from exposure to
illness.122 While such construction of the term “bodily injury” can be
grounded on various rationales, it is also often recognized to be the one
that maximizes coverage and provide more funds to compensate tort
plaintiffs.123 As one court admitted, “although there are solid arguments to
support the manifestation theory, we are bound to broadly construe the
See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1193
(2d Cir. 1995). An intermediate approach adopted by a plurality of juristictions is the
“injury in fact” construction, holding that an injury occurs when the body’s defenses are
“overwhelmed.” See, e.g., American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748
F.2d760 (2d Cir. 1984).
122 Id.; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123 Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041, 1043, 1047 (selecting an interpretation of “occurrence” that
makes available to victims the deepest possible pocket of financial relief); Eagle Picher
Industries v Liberty Mutual, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982) (construing an ambiguous policy
language in favor so as “to promote coverage”); Owens–Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance
Co., 138 N.J. 437, 451-52 (1994) (where the court noted that “[t]he court in Keene, relied
on the presumption of maximizing coverage”); Winding Hills Condominium Ass’n, Inc.
v. North American Specialty Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 837, 840 (N.J. 2000) (“the law's
solicitousness for victims of mass toxic torts and other environmental contamination is
entirely consistent with choosing that conceptually viable trigger theory affording the
greatest ultimate redress.”).
121
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insurance policies to promote coverage.”124 This trend is particularly
striking because the maximizing-coverage canon seems to override other,
more principled attempts at interpretation. A principled construction of
timing element of bodily injuries would have increased the available
insurance coverage in some cases and reduced it in others.125 It is also
striking because in other contexts—where the court has to determine the
number of occurrences—a different construction of what it means for an
injury to occur is adopted, but again it is result oriented: to maximize victim
compensation.126 Courts unabashedly choose a construction for the
purpose of maximizing coverage, sacrificing conceptual consistency in
order to advance the social policy of protecting a population of nonparty
victims.
3. Environmental Harms.
Commercial liability insurance covers “all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages.”127 What about remediation
expenditures? Are these covered damages, or—as they are not paid in
compensation to victims—are they merely non-covered mitigation efforts?
What if such mitigation costs are incurred prior to the harm, or prior to any
claim against the policyholder? In general, costs spent to comply with
injunctions or preventive regulation, or to mitigate actual or potential harm,
do not count as “damages” under the policy and thus not covered by
insurance.128 But, interestingly, in environmental cases courts
“overwhelmingly” apply an exception to this interpretive rule and instead
hold that response costs to toxic spills and remediation costs of waste sites

Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1219-20 (6th Cir.
1980).
125 For example, the Second Circuit in Stonewall, 73 F.3d 1178, interpreted “occurrence”
twice; once resulting in a likely increase in available coverage, and once resulting in a
decrease in coverage. Compare id. at 1197-1200 (interpreting “occurrence” for bodily injury
claims to allow coverage throughout a gradual disease, so long as injury can be shown at
each point, thus likely increasing coverage under more policies), with id. at 1212-13
(interpreting “occurrence” for property damage claims to constitute separate occurrences,
as opposed to a single continuous occurrence, thus reducing coverage because of “per
occurrence” deductibles).
126 See ABRAHAM AND SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 529 (5th ed. 2020)
(suggesting that courts often focus on victim compensation when assessing the number of
occurrences issue).
127 See What Is General Liability Insurance?, 2 TOXIC TORTS PRAC. GUIDE § 32:4 (May 2021).
128 See e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding costs
spent in litigation regarding intentional failure to comply with an injunction were not
recoverable as damages); Grisham v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir.
1991) (affirming a judgment holding that “clean-up costs are not encompassed within the
meaning of the word ‘damages’ in the standard form [comprehensive general liability]
policies at issue”); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987)
(“The general comprehensive liability policy between the parties covers ‘damages,’ but not
the expenditures which result from complying with the directives of regulatory agencies.”).
124
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are covered as “damages.”129 Here, again, the rationale for the pro-coverage
construction is a type of nonparty interest—to reduce the negative social
impact. Environmental harms are the iconic negative externality, affecting
society as a whole. The broad construction of the term “damages” in
environmental policies would bring in more insurance money for
environmental remediation, and while courts do not explicitly invoke this
reason, it is likely the unspoken rationale.130
Not always unspoken. Interestingly, this trend of expanding
coverage for environmental cleanup costs has developed to the point where
some courts are permitting recovery for voluntary cleanup, prior to any
government order or lawsuit. This is a striking expansion of the meaning of
the “legally obligated to pay damages” clause, which is the contractual
trigger for the insurer’s duty to indemnify the policyholder. As one court
explained
“[i]nsurance coverage in the environmental claims area may
be quite different than in other insurance settings.
Environmental statutes impose liability, often without fault,
on polluters in order to safeguard society in general.131
If voluntary cleanup costs are not covered, the court said, “the policyholder
would have a strong incentive not to undertake voluntary cleanup which,
in turn, would delay cleanup, exacerbate the degree of contamination and
increase the ultimate cost of cleanup.” This would “severely impede the
ability of the federal and state governments to accomplish cleanup at the
thousands of contaminated sites extant.”132 The overwhelming nonparty
interest has thus shaped the interpretation of the contract.
4. Intentional Harm.

Peter J. Kalis, Thomas M. Reiter and James R. Segerdahl, Policyholder’s Guide to the Law
of Insurance Coverage 5.03 (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2017).
130 See Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 618 A.2d 777 (1992) (holding remedial
response costs could be covered, altering the court’s prior interpretation of ‘damages’
under Desrochers v. New York Cas. Co. 106 A.2d 196 (1954)); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507 (1990). See also FRENCH & JERRY, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
246); Stanzler & Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup Costs: History of the Word “Damages”
Under CGL Policies, 16 COLUM J. ENV’T L. 73 (1991).
131 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 152 (1994) (allowing for
coverage of preemptory cleanup and reversing the trial court’s order as it “create[d] a
serious conflict between the local governments’ duty to act promptly in response to
statutory liabilities to protect the public health and environment and the duty to preserve
the availability of the liability insurance coverage purchased to financially protect the
public.”).
132 Id. (citing TOD I. ZUCKERMAN & MARK C. RASKOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
LITIGATION § 3.02, at 3-8 (1992)). See also Mark S. Dennison, Insured’s Proof that
Environmental Cleanup Costs are Covered “Damages” Under CGL Insurance Policy, 39 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 483 (2021 update).
129
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Our last example of nonparty defaults in insurance contracts
concerns the exclusion of intentional harms. All liability insurance policies
have such exclusion. In fact, insurance law prohibits coverage for
intentional harms, as a matter of longstanding mandatory public policy. But
what counts as intentional harm? Here, too, courts differ quite sharply, but
the majority view holds that both the act and the injurious result have to be
intended: “it must be shown that the insured intended by his act to produce
the damage which did in fact occur.”133 This is a stricter requirement
compared to the standards applied in tort law for this very same activity,
where intentionality is found even when the actor did not subjectively desire
to produce the actual injury, as long as such result could reasonably be
expected.
Why the narrower construction of intent in insurance contracts, as
compared to tort law? The simple answer: increase coverage to victims. If
insurance contract law used the same test as tort law, more harms would be
excluded, and more nonparty victims would have been left without
redress.134 It is the interest that “an innocent third person receives the
protection afforded by insurance” that underlies the interpretive canon.135
In a striking illustration of this canon, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that death caused to innocent victims by a deliberate (and
criminally punished) arsonist was not intentional. The Court explained that
a stricter definition of intent under the contract “is the correct standard for
liability insurance cases. Since one purpose of such insurance is to protect
injured third parties, as between the liability insurer of a culpable actor and
an innocent third party it is the better policy to place the risk of loss with
the insurer where intent to injure is unclear.”136 Similarly, injuries caused by
deliberate injurious acts of drivers (e.g., taxi drivers assaulting passengers)
could be covered under their auto liability insurance, again to advance the
goal of “compensating innocent victims.”137 The same logic is applied in
cases of innocent co-insureds—where the policyholder attacks his spouse,
who is also a named insured on the policy (thus not quite a “nonparty” to
the contract). Courts reason that the spouse’s interest in recovery trumps
the insurer’s right to a broad intentional acts exclusion.138
Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Swanson, 58 Ohio St. 3d 189, 909 (1991) (citing
Eisenman v. Hornberger, 264 A. 2d 673, 674 (Pa. 1970)); RESTATEMENT OF LAW,
LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 45 (AM. L. INST. 2019).
134 Jerry & Richmond, supra note 44.
135 Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1978).
136 Id. at 609. See also RESTATEMENT OF LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 47 cmt g (AM. L.
INST. 2019).
137 Nassau Ins. Co. v. Mel Jo-Jo Cab Corp., 102 Misc. 2d 455, 463–64 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 78
A.D.2d 549 (1980); Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 155 F.2d
117 (4th Cir. 1946).
138 See, e.g., Harvey’s Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 606 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Nev.
1980) (courts are required to interpret the insurance contract broadly and afford the
greatest possible coverage to the insured); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Molloy, 433
133
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From a corrective justice perspective, it is said that victims of
intentional wrongs are entitled to receive compensation no less, and
perhaps more, than victims of negligent wrongs. Since the tortfeasor’s
liability insurance is the primary source of recovery, this interest in broad
redress justifies the result-oriented narrowing of the contractual exclusion
term.139 To emphasize, this definition of ‘intent’ in insurance law is a default
rule. Insurers can override it by express instruction. They sometimes do,
redrafting the policies to narrow down the coverage of some particularly
egregious intentional harms.140 But much of the nonparty-driven
construction is allowed to stand (for reasons that we investigate later).
In sum, insurance contract law helps us demonstrate a variety of
contexts in which courts apply a specific principle: interpret and construct
the contract in a manner that advances nonparty interests. The specific
nonparty interests courts advance are varied but share a common thread.
They promote diffuse benefits for society and serve objectives central to
the regulatory framework that breeds the liability these insurance contracts
cover. Auto insurance is intended to advance the compensation of road
victims; Environmental liability insurance is constructed with an eye to the
harm-mitigation goals of environmental law; and insurance for mass torts
is a primary response to long-tail product harms.
*

*

*

We reviewed in this section four examples of insurance contract
construction guided by a specific nonparty interest—strengthen the
financing mechanism of tort compensation. This interest is advanced even
if insurers react by increasing premia. It can be, but it is often not,
undermined by the redrafting of insurance contracts, as we will later explain.
Before ending this insurance illustration, we briefly note that other
nonparty interests, apart from broadening victim compensation, are
invoked in insurance contract construction, and could have the opposite
effect of reducing coverage. For example, courts may interpret ambiguous
language to exclude coverage for punitive damages. In liability insurance
contracts, these exclusions are mandated by law, prohibiting people from
insuring penal liability. But in first-party insurance the exclusions are
constructed by courts to limit an injured driver’s ability to recover from
their insurer the punitive damages assessed against their uninsured injurer.
As the Supreme Court of Arizona explained, the “social policies” underlying
first party coverage for auto-related injuries caused by other uninsured
motorists require an “interpretation that furthers public policy” and
A.2d 1135 (MD 1981); Watson v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 566 N.W.2d 683
(Minn. 1997); Willy E. Rice, Destroyed Community Property, Damaged Persons, and Insurers’ Duty
to Indemnify Innocent Spouses and Other Co-Insured Fiduciaries: An Attempt to Harmonize Conflicting
Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory Judgments, 2 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 63 (2009).
139 RESTATEMENT OF LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 47 cmt f (AM. L. INST. 2019).
140 See Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, Insurance Law and Policy 414 (4th ed.); Wright v.
Allstate Cas. Co. 797 N.W.2d 531.
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excludes punitive damages recovery by the victim.141 The court viewed this
principle as superseding the more common contra proferentum interpretive
cannon, of assigning the meaning least favorable to the insurer.142
C. Remedies
A breach of contract gives rise to various remedies and, unless the
contract states otherwise, the law provides rules to determine which remedy
is primary and how to value the underlying harm that damage remedies seek
to redress. In general, the common law prefers the award of money
damages to the plaintiff over specific performance or other injunctive relief.
And among monetary awards, the law prefers remedies that measure the
pecuniary loss from non-performance. But there are notable exceptions to
this hierarchy, whereby courts favor in-kind remedies, or damages that
measure the loss differently. The typical ground for such exceptions is the
“inadequacy” of the standard pecuniary damages to make the aggrieved
party whole. One typical scenario in which damages are thought to be
inadequate is when the subject matter of the contract is “unique” in some
sense, namely, when it is difficult to procure a suitable substitute or to assess
the damages needed to guarantee such procurement.143 Another scenario
for varying the default is the presence of an in-kind non-pecuniary interest
as a principal contractual purpose.144
Non-party interests have an important role in the application of
these exceptions. We offer several prominent examples how nonparty
interests, and especially the diffuse social impact of breach, factor in favor
of a particular in-kind redress, including specific performance or
compensatory measures tailored to reverse concrete social harms and
secure in-kind completion or preservation of a socially valuable outcome.
In short, we show that remedies are sometimes bolstered to protect not
only the plaintiff’s interests, but also nonparties—the presence of nonparty
default remedies.
1.

Environmental Harm.

Private contracts to extract natural resources often impact
environmental interests, including wildlife, vegetation, waters, air, and land
erosion. For example, when private land is leased for mining with a promise
to restore it, some of the methods used by mining companies leave lasting
harms, and when these harms are not remediated contract law is called upon
to determine the damages owed to the owners.

State Farm v. Wilson, 782 P.2d 727, 731 (Ariz. 1989)
Id. at 733.
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
144 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS __ (4th ed. 2004).
141
142
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The problem of valuing such harm is a staple of first year contracts
courses. What damages should the mining company, having breached its
promise to restore the land, pay to the aggrieved owners? The owners
usually ask for damages equal to the cost of repairing the damage, whereas
the defendant offers to pay a smaller amount—the decline in the property’s
market value due to non-restoration. Who can forget the classic case of
Peevyhouse v. Galand Coal Co., where a 5-to-4 majority of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court awarded the aggrieved property owners $300 in damages,
representing the diminution in value of their property, instead of the
$29,000 it would have taken to repair the damage?145
The social impact of ravaged tracts of land overtime led courts to
broaden their view, recognizing that unrestored land has devastating
negative effect on society, and awarding damages to enable landowners to
achieve in-kind repair of the land. Twenty years after Peevyhouse, a federal
court applying Oklahoma law explained that “[a]t the time of Peevyhouse,
Oklahoma had no stated policy concerning land reclamation after mining
operation [. . . and] considered only the economic benefits to the parties.”
The court predicted that “the public policy of the state has changed” and,
to further this revised environmental policy, it awarded $375,000 the
plaintiffs needed to restore the land, instead of the $6800 diminution-invalue damages.146
Notably, such newly discovered sensibility towards the
environmental impact did not originate in courts. Oklahoma, for example,
passed in 1967 the Oklahoma Open Cut Land Reclamation Act, which
made reclamation and conservation of land a “policy of this state.”147 That
statute, likes similar ones in other states,148 did not mandate in-kind
restoration remedies for breach by a mining company. Parties to a mining
lease could, potentially, place the burden of reclamation on the lessors.
Nevertheless, the explicit adoption of the policy operated to change the
damages default rule that applies when a promise to restore is breached.
2. Economic Vitality
Major busines-to-business transactions are the cogwheels of a
thriving economy, and their breach—even if compensated—can affect
multiple “stake holders”, could lead to loss of jobs and even regional or
sectorial decline. When a large client breaches a long-term contract and
cancels a large order from a local business, the business would often have
to downsize its operations and let many workers go. Similarly, when a
merger or takeover agreement is breached numerous parties can be
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
Rock Island Improv. Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, 698 F.2d 1075, 1078 (10th Cir. 1983).
147 45 OK STAT § 45-722 (2019).
148OHIO REV. CODE § 1513.37 (2017); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/2 (1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 49-601–49-624)(2014).
145
146
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affected. The owners of a breached-against business may be fully
compensated for their lost profits. But in selecting the remedy for breach,
should courts take the broader impact on nonparties into account? Should
courts order specific performance, rather than an award of expectation
damages (as they sometimes do in long-term requirements contracts149), to
also protect diffuse interests of workers, families, surrounding businesses,
and the local economy?
A classic statement of this position comes from In Re IBP Securities
Litigation.150 In the case, Tyson and IBP had entered into a merger
agreement where (simplifying greatly) Tyson agreed to buy the shares of
IBP and take over its operations, becoming the largest meat producer in the
country. When economic realities changed, Tyson backed out and breached
the agreement. Delaware courts, like other common law jurisdictions,
typically grant specific enforcement of a sale contract of such unique asset
only when it is the buyer who seeks to enforce it, reasoning that the buyer
would not be able to find another asset like this in the “market.” (Sellers are
usually denied in-kind remedy, because they can resell to another buyer and
be compensated for the contract-resale differential in straightforward
manner.) In this case it was the seller who sought specific enforcement, and
successfully persuaded the court to grant it. Key to the court decision were
nonparty interests in the merger. In a landmark decision, Vice Chancellor
Strine weighed the disruptive effects of unwinding the contract on a large
circle of “constituencies” and explained:
A compulsory order will require a merger of two public
companies with thousands of employees working at facilities
that are important to the communities in which they operate.
The impact of a forced merger on constituencies beyond the
stockholders and top managers of IBP and Tyson weighs
heavily on my mind. The prosperity of IBP and Tyson means
a great deal to these constituencies. I therefore approach this
remedial issue quite cautiously and mindful of the interests
of those who will be affected by my decision.151
Recognizing that a damages award “can be shaped”, the court
nevertheless noted that “the Tyson constituencies would be better served
on the whole by a specific performance remedy, rather than a large damages
award that did nothing but cost Tyson a large amount of money.”152 The
court reversed the remedial default rule for breach of an M&A contract,
from money damages to specific performance, to avoid the economic
disruption that breach would cause nonparties. Importantly, this choice
was validated by later events, whereby merging parties explicitly contracted
Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts, 72 N.J. Eq. 831 (Ch. 1907); Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil
Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
150 In re IBP S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
151 Id. at 83.
152 Id. at 84.
149
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for a specific performance remedy, thus signaling to other courts the utility
of this default rule.153
This same question—whether to consider the interests of
nonparties to justify a specific performance remedy—came up in another
casebook classic, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co,154
albeit with a different result. In that case, the buyer, a power utility,
breached a 20-year contract to purchase coal from a Wyoming coal mine.
The coal mine was awarded damages of $181 million—an amount that all
parties agreed was a reasonable estimate of the lost profits—but sought
instead the remedy of specific performance. Money damages, the seller
argued, “will do nothing for the miners who have lost their jobs because
the mine is closed and the satellite businesses that have closed for the same
reason.”155
Writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, Judge Posner had no
difficulty dismissing this claim. Miners and satellite businesses “are not
parties to the contract” nor third-party beneficiaries and therefore “their
losses are irrelevant.”156 Posner recognized that “consequences to third
parties of granting an injunctive remedy, such as specific performance, must
be considered, and in some cases may require the remedy be withheld.” But
he sought to limit the relevance of nonparty interests in the choice of
remedy only to a (not fully developed) category of interests accruing to “real
parties of interest.”
The Posner opinion in Carbon County can be read as a blunt denial
of a nonparty default remedy. We bring it here primarily to illustrate how
courts could fall on either side of this approach. But a close reading of the
opinion suggests that, rather than a categorical rejection of nonparty
defaults, it reflects a subtle and receptive view towards such analysis.
Indeed, as we further develop below, the rejection in that case, of the
specific nonparty interests embodied in regional economic vitality, is sound.
For one, an award of specific performance was unlikely to be implemented.
Judge Posner predicted it would merely lead to a round of renegotiation for
its cancellation (noting that the coal mine already closed down, unlikely to
be reopened).157 This is the problem of ex-post opt-out that we discussed
earlier as one of the justifications for the party primacy norm.
Moreover, any calculus of societal interests should not have ended
with the interest of the local economy. A 20-year supply of coal to one of
Indiana’s largest utility companies would have had other nonparty effects,
both environmental and economic. Some of this negative social impact was
noted by Judge Posner, explaining that continued production of
Theresa Arnold, Amanda Dixon, Hadar Tanne, Madison Sherrill, & Mitu Gulati,
“Lipstick on a Pig”: Specific Performance Clauses in Action, 2021 WIS L. REV. 359 (2021).
154 N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
155 Id. at 279.
156 Id.
157 Id.
153
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“uneconomical” coal, which “costs much more to get out of the ground
than it is worth . . . would impose costs on society greater than the
benefits.”158 Moreover, the breaching buyer in the case ended up purchasing
other sources of energy from other suppliers, thus enhancing the economic
vitality of another supply region. And, centrally, the shift of the buyer to
other sources of energy potentially reflects the relative environmental and
pollution costs of different inputs. It is impractical to expect a court to
balance the various competing and large-scale societal impacts in the energy
supply chain. This is the institutional competence problem that, we noted earlier,
justifies contract courts’ submission to the party primacy norm.
3. Interest of Consumers in the Chain of Distribution.
Another nonparty interest which courts look to in the choice of
remedy is that of consumers and end-users who are affected by upstream
supply contracts. Does the resolution of the present dispute and the
remedy granted impact the consumers and their ability to be served?
This question came up in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., where a supplier of natural gas breached a long-term contract
with a utility company by overcharging.159 Recognizing that such markups
are passed through to customers of the utility company, and that increases
in the cost of electricity are disruptive to the public, the court issued
injunctive relief. The nonparty interest was clear—“to underwrite just and
reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas.”160 While the aggrieved
utility company could be adequately compensated by monetary damages
equal to the overcharges, and while it might also subsequently refund the
pass-through price increase to its diffuse customers, the court concluded
that a negative social impact would nevertheless ensue. “A refund of
overcharges sometime in the future could never adequately compensate
families living at or close to the poverty line for hardships they would
endure as a result of overcharges they would have to pay at present and
during the course of litigation.”161
Like in the Carbon County decision discussed above, the court noted
that it is indeed considering harms to parties in the supply chain who are
not part to the contract or the suit, nor are they third party beneficiaries.
But the court concluded that even in adjudicating private contract disputes
it is required to “take into account the vital public interest which may be in
Id.
760 F.2d 618.
160 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962); Natural Gas
Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717.
161 760 F.2d, at 625. The Mississippi Utility Reform Act of 1983 further declared such
policy. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 77–3–2 (Supp.1984). As the Chairman of the Commission
testified in the case, “one of the primary obligations of the new legislation was to prevent
charges from being passed on to any consumers before some judicial or administrative
determination on the lawfulness of the charges.”
158
159
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jeopardy.” Such requirement would be “meaningless” if the court were
“constrained to consider only the immediate interests of the parties to the
contract.”162 This attention to the importance of public interests in
preliminary injunctions is increasingly shared by courts and
commentators.163 Here, as in the other examples presented above, the social
interest is protected not by a mandatory rule. Careful drafting by the parties
would probably succeed in overriding the remedial default rules.
Nevertheless, as we explain later, it has more than anecdotal impact on
nonparty interests.
4. Social Interests Warranted in the Contact
Consumer products are increasingly sold with the promise for social
value. Cars are warranted to be “green,” food as “fair trade,” and furniture
to be “locally made.” What if these assurances turn out to be false? It is
increasingly recognized that, while such specialty products are often more
expensive, a remedy equal to a refund of the price premium would fall short
of making aggrieved buyers whole. To a vegetarian who spent a few extra
dollars to purchase plant-based meat substitute, the harm from consuming
it and learning that it was made from beef exceeds the pecuniary
overcharge. While the harm to buyers is caused by the violation of social
interests they cherish, the promotion of which was part of the basis of the
bargain, some remedy to redress that harm is obviously needed.
Thus, for example, when Volkswagen sold vehicles branded as
“clean diesel” while in fact they emitted toxic gases at high rate and were
equipped with cheat devices to pass emissions test, the claims by aggrieved
buyers for redress that recognizes their violated environmental interest was
taken seriously. In the class action brought by owners of the vehicle, the
court approved a settlement that included close to $5 billion for restoration
of environmental harms caused by the vehicles. This included $2 billion to
promote the use of zero emissions vehicles and $2.7 billion to reduce
nitrogen oxides emissions.164
We view this remedial regime as a method to preserve nonparty
interests, albeit ones that the parties themselves sought to advance. It is
when the seller explicitly warrants a product to have a specific social or
ethical feature that such warranty ought to be backed by a remedy
compensating not only for the buyer’s financial loss but also the social
interest. Such remedy would lend credibility to the seller’s promise, allow
760 F.2d, at 625.
John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 549 (1978);
see also 7 J. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 65.04[1] (2d ed. 1984).
164 Volkswagen Settlement, at 39-40. Order Granting Final Approval of the 2.0-Liter TDI
Consumer and Reseller Dealership Class Action Settlement at 2; In re Volkswagen “Clean
Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 2672 CRM (JSC) (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/2867/Order- GrantingFinal-Approval-of-Consumer-Sett.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EEV-9PLC].
162
163
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buyers to take the promise seriously, and fashion contracts as a tool to
promote nonparty interests.
A general template for such redress would allow courts to remedy
a breach of a social interest warranty with “restoration damages.”165 This is
a monetary award paid not to the plaintiff directly, but instead to restore
the underlying social interest that the contract warranted and the breach
impaired. A court would have to identify this interest and devise a channel
through which the breaching party could contribute to its remediation (as
the court did in the VW litigation, by requiring the defendant to invest
specific sums in emission-reducing technology). While such damage
measure would expand upon the longstanding remedial default rules in
contract law, which were traditionally stingy in protecting “emotional
distress” arising in such circumstances, it would be suitable for contracts
and products that explicitly promise social value.
D. Excuse Doctrines
The various excuse doctrines—impossibility, impracticability, and
frustration of purpose—provide courts the opportunity to consider
nonparty interests. These doctrines operate as default rules, filling gaps in
the allocation of risks that arise from changed circumstances. As with other
discharge rules, like the mistake doctrine, courts fill the risk-allocation gaps
based on implied intent of the parties166 or their relative capacity to bear
these risks.167 But nonparty interests could also factor into the outcome.
In Part I above we mentioned the Hanford (polio) case, where the
parties had not allocated in the contract the costs of a later arriving public
risk.168 Hanford’s rule appears to be nondelegable: the contract was rescinded
because its performance would harm the public. But in other contexts, an
unexpected risk to nonparties can be addressed via a gap-filler. The
Restatement (Second) of Contract illustrates this possibility with a contract
to ship goods to a foreign country, which is disrupted by a civil war that
erupts at the destination and puts incoming ships at risk when approaching
the port. “The risk of injury to others is sufficient to make [carrier’s]
performance impracticable” and the contract is discharged.169 Interestingly,
the Restatement further adds that if another even more weighty nonparty
interest is at stake—for example, if the ship is carrying supplies “vital to the
health of the population of the designated port”—the contract will not be

Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, The Restoration Remedy in Private Law, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1901 (2018).
166 Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 154 (AM. L. INST. 1981); U.C.C. § 2615 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
168 See text accompanying notes 62-64.
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 ill. 7(AM. L. INST. 1981).
165
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excused.170 Nonparty interests take center stage and may point at different
directions, with courts instructed to find the right balance among them.
The recent Covid epidemic provides an opportunity to examine the
prevalence of nonparty interests in shaping the scope of the excuse
doctrine. While many cases alleging impracticability are still moving through
courts, and mostly focusing on the parties’ expectations, one recent case
illustrates the nonparties angle.171 In that case, the parties contracted to
repair a sidewalk, and specified per diem liquidated damages for every day
of delayed performance. During the repair work Covid arrived and
construction halted. The repairing party sought to use the public health
emergency as an excuse for nonperformance and avoidance of damages.
The court agreed, though it was not clear that the Governor’s lockdown
order compelled the delay. Why? Because, the court reasoned, the
contractual provisions “were not intended to incentivize [the parties] to
break the law, put lives at risk, and/or exacerbate a public health crisis that
is estimated to have caused the deaths of 1 in 347 New York City
residents.”172 That is, with sufficiently strong nonparty interests the court
expanded the excuse gap-filler to protect them. However, it seems clear
from the case that had the parties allocated the risk of a public health crisis
differently in the contract, the court would have deferred to that choice.

III.

IN (PARTIAL) DEFENSE OF NONPARTY DEFAULTS

Part II showed that courts routinely account for nonparty interests,
despite what we described as valid concerns that doing so will be either
futile (the opt out problem) or misdirected and even harmful (the
institutional competence problem). In this Part, we turn from the
descriptive to the normative. If nonparty defaults are really so bad, why do
they exist?
A. Institutional Division of Labor
Although there are many good reasons that legislators are often
best-suited to looking after social interests,173 there are circumstances in
which courts are in a comparatively good and sometimes superior position
to provide effective protection to widely accepted nonparty interests. We
highlight those circumstances here, and then explain further special
circumstances where courts can use nonparty defaults to narrowly tailor

Id. § 261 ill. 8.
Only Props., LLC v. Sylvia Wald & Po Kim Art Gallery, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10706
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020).
172 Id.
173 See Bagchi, supra note 10; Casey & Niblett, supra note 22.
170
171
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intermediate results that are not readily available to legislators and
regulators.
Judicial protection of nonparty interests in contract law is less
troublesome when it works as a complement, rather than substitute, for ex-ante
regulation, particularly when legislation uses standard-like objectives, rather
than bright line rules. Common law courts assemble the relevant social
interests from specific enactments dictated by lawmakers and double-check
that these interests are not subjugated by the contract.
For example, when a regulator like the EPA regulates by setting a
precise command like rates of impermissible air pollution, courts should
refrain from interfering with this regulatory effort. But much environmental
regulation does not involve precise particles per liter of air. It leaves enough
unspecified domain that allows courts to observe the specific realization of
the tradeoff between the relevant interests and resolve disputes in a manner
that advances the environmental objectives the law seeks to advance. Thus,
where regulators are vague, courts should be emboldened to fill the
nonparty gaps.
Courts have done that in various contexts. As we noted, courts are
interpreting insurance contracts to allow coverage of environmental
cleanup by the policyholder even when done voluntarily, thereby expanding
the interpretation of the term “damages.”174 This expanded meaning
deviates from the way the term “damages” is interpreted by courts in other
insurance contexts, where it typically does not include voluntary pre-injury
mitigation. Why the broader interpretation? Courts and commentators
justify it as a strategy to serve the goals of environmental statutes, including
the rules that create the environmental liability which the insurance contract
protects against.
Or, to take the stripmining environmental example, where the social
interest is to reclaim damaged land, it was legislation that initially recognized
this interest. Beginning in the 1970s, states addressed the environmental
harms caused by stripmining and enacted laws requiring remedial
restoration of mined land.175 Prior to these laws, we saw, courts tended to
ignore that social harm when adjudicating contract breach lawsuits brought
by owners against mining companies that left the grounds unrestored.
Whether to award remedies for the cost of restoration or merely for the
decline in the value of the owners’ land was a question that courts
historically resolved based on what they regarded as the parties’ interests,
ignoring nonparty and social aspects. Ironically, concern for such wider
interests was sometimes labeled “economic waste.”176 But once statutes
See text accompanying notes 131-132, supra.
OHIO REV. CODE § 1513.37 (2017); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/2 (1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 49-601–49-624) (2014).
176 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (1962) (reference to
“economic waste” based on cost and benefit to the parties alone.)
174
175
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were enacted and the social reclamation interest was recognized, courts
reversed the remedial default rule. Explaining that the social policy has
changed, judges required breaching companies to pay for the full cost of
restoration.177 Nonparty interests crept into contract law to more fully
protect the targets that lawmakers marked. And their implementation in
specific cases turned on the facts of each dispute.
A similar pattern undergirds other examples we surveyed in Part II.
For example, expanding coverage via interpretation of auto insurance
policies advances the widely accepted goal of strict liability tort law and of
auto insurance regulation—to spread the cost suffered by road victims
broadly. Similarly, the asbestos crisis has led to various regulatory efforts to
protect the public from asbestos-related illnesses.178 These efforts manifest
a social policy to give victims various measure of redress. Again, they do
not preclude the effort of courts to interpret commercial liability insurance
policies in a manner that ultimately affords victims more compensation.
In these and other contexts, laws advancing social interests leave
room for courts to advance the same interest in complementary ways. This
is a familiar congruity between regulation and the common law, and it has
a rich jurisprudential and constitutional underpinning.179 For example,
when the FDA regulates drug warnings, state courts adjudicating tort suits
can bolster patient protection by requiring additional warnings.180 When
securities law makes it illegal to engage in manipulation or deception, or
when federal and state laws mandate disclosures for various products and
activities, courts identify the specific categories of violations, sometimes
relying on the contours of common law fraud and contractual
misrepresentation to heighten the protection to consumers.
This regulation-versus-common law duality applies in a nuanced
manner in the administration of contractual remedies. In many contexts, a
breach of contract may also violate statutory prohibitions. When courts
refuse to enforce a contract that is against public policy, they still must
determine remedial consequences of its partial performance. If, for
example, a tenant already occupied an apartment that violates tenancy laws
(which are sometimes justified by broader social interests), the parties might
dispute the pecuniary results from partial performance. Courts often hold
that any remaining obligations depend on the breach of the common law’s
Rock Island Improvement Company v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075, 1078
(10th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Shell Oil Co., 795 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Schneberger
v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1994); Miller v. C.K.L., Inc., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS
4069 (Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988).
178 R.D. Brownson, Current and Historical American Asbestos Regulations, 53 MONALDI
ARCHIVES CHEST DISEASE 181 (1998).
179 Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
(2020) (arguing that stakeholder interests are advanced by shareholder activism, rather than
management actions); Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
1097 (2020) (showing that shareholder proposals advance stakeholder interests).
180 Wyath v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
177
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implied warranty of habitability.181 In effect, a regime that generally
considers nonparty interests in the enforcement of contracts is tweaked to
also account for the gravity of such interests vis-à-vis the parties’ claims.
But this account—contract rules bolstering preexisting legislative
policy—becomes less tractable when interests are harder to pin down. 182
Economic viability of a region is a primary example. Would it be anomalous
for courts enforcing private contracts to consider such economic interests?
Unlike, say, the environmental impact of coal mining, which is regulated by
environmental law and subject to careful measurement of social impact and
trade-offs, the macroeconomic impact of a breach of major transaction is
harder to evaluate through the lens of specific laws. It would therefore be
more objectionable for courts to advance a redistributive goal but serve the
economic interests of only a subset stakeholders (workers, shoppers).
Beyond complementing legislated social interests, courts are well
positioned to advance nonparty interests in another manner: in scenarios
where ex ante rulemaking has not responded yet to new circumstances,
especially in cases where rapidly evolving social risks are, effectively, not
regulable at the time of performance. Hanford—and Covid—offer examples
of this problem in action. Regulators, burdened by administrative rules
against precipitous action, or political sclerosis, will sometimes fail to offer
clear guidance. One party may then seek to take nonparty interests into
account when deciding how or whether to perform. Because these choices
occur in the shadow of regulatory ambiguity, courts will be forced in effect
to judge the asserted public interest in an area of law that ordinarily is
outside of their competence. But if courts reject the burden, stating that
they lack the ability to adjudicate public interests at all, that would leave
rapidly changing social risks rarely cognizable as excuses—a default rule
that permits externalizing costs. That would have potentially unfortunate
social effects.183
In sum, while contract law disputes are probably not the primary
platform for resolving social priorities about public policy and for
systematically and comprehensively advancing nonparty interests, they do
provide a venue to bolster accepted objectives. Accounting for nonparty
interests in contract law need not be an affront to democratic policymaking,
nor an ad-hoc exercise of judicial activism. Rather, through the incremental
approach of the common law, nonparty defaults offer a flexible and
adjustable complement to the rulemaking process.
B. Will Nonparty Defaults “Stick”?

Noble v. Alis, 474 N.E. 2d 109, 112 (Ind. 1985).
Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, supra note 10, makes a similar point about the relative
weight of diffuse and concentrated externalities.
183 Hoffman and Hwang, supra note 61, at 999-1005.
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Perhaps we convinced you that boosting nonparty interests is a task
that contract law courts have and should, sometimes, in a modest manner,
take up. But why use such technique if the parties can overturn their content
via explicit opt-outs? This section addresses the concern of opt-outs.
To start, parties will stick with nonparty defaults if they like them.
The parties’ interests may incidentally not conflict with those of nonparties,
or—stronger—the parties may embrace the external social interests and
seek to advance them. One example might be pre-clicked options which
some websites offer at checkout, allowing customers to “round up” their
payment so that spare change can benefit social interest.184 Some consumers
embrace such defaults, despite the added cost.
Parties similarly stick with contractual nonparty defaults when their
private interests are at least partially aligned with the nonparty interests.
Insured parties, for example, may be happy to enjoy the expanded liability
coverage afforded to them under liability insurance contracts when courts
embrace such expansion for its nonparty impact. Even sophisticated
commercial parties may refuse to accept a revised policy at the renewal time
if told how it specifically reduces their coverage. Or, suppliers may embrace
the expanded availability of equitable relief and specific performance
afforded to them by the nonparty default, especially when otherwise the
damage remedies provide less than make-whole redress. Such added
nonparty protections may be reflected in prices, and parties’ reluctance to
disclaim the protection may, on the margin, cost them. But it is often hard
to pin down the incremental price effect a protection.
Alternatively, a party may strategically hold on to the nonparty
default and refuse the counterpart’s request to opt out, even when it is in
its interest to ultimately disclaim them. When these defaults impose
disproportionate costs on their counterpart, there is strategic advantage
from bargaining hard over the disclaimer. If a default rule entitles a supplier
to equitable relief when the client breaches, the supplier may refuse to opt
out at the contracting stage, even if it might ultimately agree to release the
client from a specific performance remedy.
Another set of reasons why parties will not opt out is the so-called
“stickiness” of default rules—frictions that make it difficult to reverse an
unwanted default.185 A growing empirical literature shows that parties often
fail to alter or disclaim the defaults even when it seems in their interest to
do so.186 Negotiation could be costly and agreement over alternative
GrubHub and various grocery stores, for instance, encourage consumers to “round up”
and give spare change to charity.
185 Omri Ben-Shahar and John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 651 (2006).
186 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017) (finding that parties to sovereign debt contracts
use standard provisions even though no parties have a clear understanding what those
provisions mean).
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provisions may be elusive; the clarity of settled defaults may be valuable,
especially given the uncertainty how courts would interpret an opt out;187
the aspects of the transaction governed by the default may be viewed, ex
ante, as low-likelihood and not worth the trouble of renegotiation; and
various informational limitations may disrupt the parties assessment of the
relative values of the default and its alternatives.188 Accordingly, when
factors contributing to the stickiness of defaults are present, courts’ resort
to gap fillers that serve nonparty interests may be effective.
Consider, for example, the dynamics of opt out in insurance
contracts. It is widely believed that when courts interpret an insurance
contract in a manner that expands coverage to the benefit of the policy
holder (for example, under the doctrines of reasonable expectations and contra
proferentum) insurers could swiftly respond by repricing the policy, and the
policyholder could then choose whether to pay the extra premium or agree
to an opt out from that interpretation. Likewise, if courts interpret the
insurance policy in a manner that benefits nonparties, it might seem even
more straightforward for the insurer to redraft the policy and opt out of
such interpretation.
The success of such redrafting depends in part on how protective
courts are of their judicially developed nonparty defaults.189 Consider two
forms of court resistance, depending on the specificity of the attempted opt
out. When the opt out provision in the contract is highly specific,
attempting to override a concrete application of a nonparty default, courts
would follow it literally but restrict its effect to that narrow context. Here,
each specific application of a nonparty default would have to be met with
its own specific and targeted opt out instruction. Conversely, when the opt
out technique is general, instructing courts to abandon an entire canon of
nonparty interest interpretation, courts might disregard it.
For example, as we showed earlier, courts interpreting the liability
coverage under auto insurance policies find that the coverage extends to
many scenarios in which the driver did not receive permission from the
insured, or in which the driver violated the terms of the permission. 190
Courts apply a blanket of nonparty interest interpretations to the omnibus
clause in the contract, which determines which drivers are covered. Because
these are default rules, insurers can respond by overriding any of these
specific expansions. They could write, for example, that coverage extends
only to drivers permitted by the insured, not to those permitted by the
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1105 (2006).
188 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Cost Theory of Default Rules, 88 U. CHI.
L. REV. 581 (2021).
189 See Boardman, supra note 42, for further hurdles to redrafting.
190 Odolecki v. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 264 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1970); French v.
Hernandez, 184 N.J. 144, 875 A.2d 943 (2005); Martusus v. Tartamosa, 150 N.J. 148, 696
A.2d 1 (1997); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 155, 299
A.2d 704 (1973) Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1998).
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insured’s permitees (no indirect permissions). And courts would likely
follow such instruction. But, unless a separate opt-out instruction is drafted,
courts would continue to expand coverage in other factual scenarios. So
while courts will be unable to expand coverage to non-permitted drivers,
they will expand coverage to, say, permitted drivers who exceeded the terms
or duration of their permission.191 In other words, when opt outs are highly
specific they would succeed but only in their limited domain; elsewhere,
courts might preserve the nonparty-interest interpretation canon.
To overcome this specificity trap, opt outs could be drafted more
generally, instructing courts to ignore nonparty interests altogether. An
insurer might draft an interpretation term in the policy whereby parties
agree that any ambiguity should not be resolved by reference to the principle
of affording more coverage to third party victims. It is standard practice for
contracts to include instructions how to interpret them,192 and thus insurers
can find the necessary legalese to say: “courts, you have to ignore diffuse
social interests in interpreting this contract.”
Will courts follow such instructions? Not necessarily. It is possible
that while courts would view any fact-specific interpretation they issue as a
gap-filler that parties may disclaim, they would at the same time embrace
the position that a wholesale opt out from the principle of social-interest
interpretation is ineffective. Court might take such general instruction as an
affront and interference with the methodology by which judges apply their
discretion. Indeed, such resistance to blanket overrides of an entire
jurisprudence are familiar. For example, common law courts were
traditionally hostile to parties instructing courts when to issue the remedy
of specific performance.193 This is not a mandatory rule; it only requires
parties to spend extra drafting effort to achieve such opt out and expand
the domain of their chosen remedy.194 Other times, nonparty defaults can
be made sticky by requiring specific disclaimers and blocking the parties’
least resistance path to opt out.
Put differently, the law may shield nonparty defaults from opt out
by installing costly altering rules.195 Require more pinpointed and deliberate
opt out rituals to successfully override the default rule is a costly altering
Id.
Acquisition agreements, for example, often include a variety of clauses that give courts
instructions on how interpret the contract. Examples include integration clauses, clauses
that disallow oral modification of the contract, and clauses in which the parties agree to
waive jury trials or in which parties agree to have their dispute heard in a particular
jurisdiction are ready examples.
193 Manchester Dairy Sys. v. Hayward, 82 N.H. 193 (1926) (“Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a controversy cannot be created or conferred by the agreement of the parties.”).
194 See, e.g., Grayson-Robinson v. Iris Constr. Corp. 8 N.Y.2d 133 (1960) (parties can opt into
the specific performance remedy by agreeing to arbitration in a forum that applies this
remedy more commonly).
195 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032
(2012).
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rule. Indeed, making defaults stickier has become a battle hymn for
consumer protection advocates, hoping that pro-consumer defaults, rather
than mandatory rules, could improve social welfare and achieve a more
equitable division of the contractual surplus—if only they can be made
stickier.196
C. The Advantage of Default Rules in Advancing
Nonparty Interests
If nonparty interests are weighty enough to qualify the party
primacy norm and affect the obligation arising out of contracts, why should
they be secured via default rule and not attain mandatory status? Out
discussion so far in this section addressed the nonparty aspect of nonparty
defaults, suggesting that it is feasible and even advisable to account for such
interests. Let us now say a few words about the default aspect of nonparty
defaults—using rules that will sometimes (and perhaps often) be reversed
by the parties.
First, even disclaimed nonparty defaults have social value like that
associated with so-called penalty default rules—the eliciting of information
that is valuable to the parties or other potential transactors. For example, a
firm disclaiming sustainability default reveals to its clientele this “quality”
attribute. True, many disclaimers are done in boilerplate fashion without
truly informing customers. But an explicit opt out makes it marginally easier
for those who care to distinguish this firm from others that embrace the
default. In some circumstances, requiring anti-social firms to opt out could
be a more effective sorting mechanism than permitting pro-social firms to
opt in. Thus, in place of mandatory rules that compel all parties to align
with the nonparty interest, and instead of the party primacy norm that
ignores those interests altogether—that is, against an all-or-nothing
regime—nonparty defaults implement a self-selection outcome
Second, nonparty defaults are flexible in another dimension: time.
Legislatures enact mandatory rules after accounting for competing social
interests and surmounting multiple veto points. Statutes are meant to last.
What’s less well appreciated is that mandatory contract rules have some of
the same character. Because mandatory rules are so scarce, they tend to
persist over time. That might be because they are deeply rooted in political
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (“[D]efault rules . . .
count as prime ‘nudges,’ understood as interventions that maintain freedom of choice, that
do not impose mandates or bans, but that nonetheless incline people’s choices in a
particular direction.”) Of course, parties’ other private interests could override even quite
sticky nonparty defaults. If, say, the implied warranty of merchantability is expanded to
require all consumer products to meet high standards of sustainability, it is quite possible
that sellers would successfully invite their less-environmentally-inclined customers to
disclaim this feature for a discount. Such ambitious policy in favor of nonparty interests
would then have to be cemented by a mandatory status.
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and legal traditions, or because they reflect longstanding public law
commands. But it might also be because they aren’t often challenged by
private parties, even those who dare to insert nonconforming clauses.
Mandatory contract rules thus tend to ossify in place.
But judge-made default rules, by contrast, emerge constantly and
fortuitously, while having short half-lives. Thus, courts can advance
nonparty interests (by, say, permitting “liberal” excuse doctrines for hosts
of weddings during Covid) without fearing a long-term unintended
economic consequence.197 The post-Covid surge of specific force majeure
clauses reallocating risks of nonperformance is a good example: early court
decisions fueled by non-party concerns that discharged contractual
obligations made way to clauses with more specific express allocation of
the risks of closures.198
This transitory nature of court-generated default jurisprudence is
more general but not well-appreciated. Scholars have tended to view
optimal default rules, which provide maximal value to transactors, as stable,
reflecting a long-term equilibrium. But a growing body of empirical analysis
of consumer contracting demonstrates that parties continue to change their
reactions to defaults in response to evolving contracting environments and
technology.199 These exogenous forces act on contracting processes
constantly, reducing the durability and enjoying the flexibility of judgemade default rules.
Put differently, because mandatory rules are more durable, the costs
of getting them wrong in the first instance are high. Where the rule concerns
diffuse nonparty interests, it is easy to see why those error costs have
discouraged experimentation. But default rules, subject to constant
evolutionary pressure, are self-limiting. The use of defaults encourages
more adventurous judging by courts, at least where there are reasons to
think that the parties have not accounted for an important, exigent, private
or social interest in their bargain. Why not offer the parties a new default
rule and let them ponder it? As Ms. Frizzle said, “Take chances, make
mistakes, and get messy!”200
CONCLUSION
We offered in this article a new way to limit the party primacy norm,
which is one of the fundamental pillars of contract law. The limiting
Hoffman and Hwang, supra note 61, at 999.
But see Robert A. Hillman, Health Crises and the Limited Role of Contract Law, 85 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (2022), who thinks that these clauses are going to violate mandatory
public policy.
199 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer StandardForm Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241 (2013).
200 A particular citation to the inspirational legal text THE MAGIC S CHOOL BUS would be
self-refuting.
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principle is nonparty interests, expressed as default rules. We devoted the
bulk of the article to demonstrating the existence of nonparty defaults and
explaining how they come about and survive.
Nonparty defaults are a conceptual benchmark. They do not fit into
any of the existing theories of default rules. The do not maximize the
contractual pie; they do not force out private information by inducing opt
out; they do not nudge or level the playing field; and they certainly do not
mimic the parties’ will. They are a different creature, focused on social
rather than parties’ interests, prodding private contracts towards social
good.
This article is a proof of concept. We have seen that nonparty
defaults exist and that they are sometimes durable, but we don’t quite know
how important and widespread they are. We were able to dig out some
examples for their adoption, but we are unable to observe the magnitude
of their rejection. We have not clearly identified what kind of social interests
nonparty defaults serve (must they always be as weighty as we have
suggested?) nor what sorts of nonparties get their interests counted.
Accordingly, we end the article with two forward looking yearnings.
First, we hope the article will encourage commentators and students
of contract law to identify the DNA of nonparty defaults in various areas
of transactional law and to show that they are prevalent. Corporate law, for
example, is engulfed in a soul-searching inquiry regarding stakeholderism—
asking whether the mandate to maximize shareholder value (a type of party
primacy norm) must be replaced by default rules that permit and even
prioritize nonparty interests.201 Employment law, to take another example,
contains pockets of nonparty defaults, for example in the rules that
administer health and retirement plans.202 Such trans-substantive evidence
for the nonparty default module would bring it further to the
methodological mainstream.
Second, and most importantly, we modestly hope that in crafting
new defaults courts and regulators will be emboldened to give nonparty
interests greater weight. In a society increasingly experiencing the harms
See, e.g., Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, U. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE (2020) (arguing that many of the corporate initiatives and changes commonly
deemed stakeholder-friendly, such as those that promise more environmentally-friendly
practices, are driven by shareholder proposals). See also Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili & Jeremy
McClane, The Lost Promise of Loan Covenants (manuscript on file with authors) (discussing
the debate between shareholder- and stakeholder-centric theories of governance).
202 Burke v. Eaton Associates, Inc., No. 09-CV-648S, slip op. at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,
2012) (apply “traditional rules of contract interpretation as long as they are consistent with
federal labor policies”); Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 91 of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO v. United Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney, 230 F.3d 569,
576 (2d Cir. 2000) (contract should be interpreted to protect the interests of participants
in financially distressed ERISA plans); Sciascia v. Rochdale Village, Inc. 851 F.Supp.2d 460
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (traditional rules of contract interpretation apply, provided they are
consistent with fair labor policies).
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that contracts governed solely by the party primacy norm can bring, the
economic analysis of contract law has an opportunity to shift gears. It can
show that contract law could become a tool to bolster social objectives.
Look around us: the products people purchase through private contracts
increasingly seek to preserve social interests—“green”, “fair trade”, “local”,
or other humanitarian or cosmopolitan values. If buyers are demanding
such accountability, and if sellers are responding by claiming to offer it,
contract law should retool and support these expectations. The nonparty
defaults identified in this article could help fill this timely role.
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